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The new Act on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, enacted by Parliament and
effective as of 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of the Bank as
the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Using an infla-
tion targeting system, the Bank seeks to attain price stability by imple-
menting a gradual, but firm disinflation programme over the course of
several years.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of
central bank policies and enhance transparency, the Bank publishes
the ‘Quarterly Report on Inflation’, covering recent and prospective
developments in inflation and evaluating the macroeconomic devel-
opments determining inflation. This publication summarises the pro-
jections and deliberations that underlie the decisions of the Monetary
Council.
The Monetary Council, the supreme decision making body of the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank, carries out a comprehensive review of the expected de-
velopment of inflation once every three months, in order to establish
the monetary conditions that are consistent with achieving the infla-
tion target. The first section of the publication is the Statement of the
Monetary Council, containing its current assessment of economic per-
spectives and the grounds for its decisions. This is followed by an analy-
sis prepared by the Economics Department on the outlook for inflation
and the main underlying macroeconomic developments. The expected
path and uncertainty of the exogenous factors used in the projection
reflect the opinion of the Monetary Council.
✧  ✧  ✧
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Statement by the Monetary Council
Disinflation is expected to
come to a halt in 2003.
In the judgement of the Monetary Council, developments since
the publication of the previous Report may lead to higher-than-
expected inflation in 2003. The Bank currently forecasts infla-
tion in 2003 to be above the target band set earlier and to be in
the upper range of the band in 2004. Given the current macr-
oeconomic outlook, prices are expected to increase at an annual
rate of around 5% in December.
The factors affecting inflation
are slower growth and higher
wage increases, lower-than-
expected fiscal correction and
rising oil prices.
Unfavourable developments in global economic activity and the
related slower annual growth in GDP, expected to be around 3.5%,
constitute downward pressure on inflation. By contrast, wage
growth, faster than the improvement in productivity, exerts in-
flationary pressure. Due to the composition of fiscal deficit re-
duction, the contractionary impact on demand will contribute
to disinflation less strongly than expected. In addition, crude oil
prices have increased considerably.
Disinflation is expected to
resume in 2004.
In the Bank’s projection, inflation may fall to a level around 4%
by end-2004. Furthermore, disinflation may gain renewed mo-
mentum as fiscal policy is to implement further significant meas-
ures next year to contract demand, consistent with the path des-
ignated by the Government’s medium-term economic policy pro-
gramme (PEP). The Bank also expects that, forced by the higher
wage growth and slower economic activity in 2003, firms will set
wages in 2004 in a more disciplined manner. The global economic
outlook appears to be less favourable than forecast earlier. Ac-
cordingly, GDP growth is expected to remain at roughly 3.5% in
2004. In the Monetary Council’s assessment, the balance of risks
to inflation in 2004 is on the downside, as international oil prices
are likely to return to earlier levels.
The Bank’s instruments available to foster disinflation are lim-
ited. Therefore, holding wage increases under control and fiscal
rigour will have a greater role to play in reducing inflation.
The repercussions of the failed
speculative attack launched to
enforce a revaluation of the
central parity are influencing
monetary conditions.
Significant amounts of speculative capital flowed into Hungary
on 15–16 January, with the purpose of enforcing a revaluation of
the currency’s central parity. However, Magyar Nemzeti Bank suc-
cessfully countered the speculative attack. As the after-effects of
the incident, the Bank anticipates lasting abundance of market
liquidity, which, in turn, points to a weaker forint exchange rate.
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Statement by the Monetary Council
Due to constraints implied by
the exchange rate band, the
Council accommodates an
inflation rate of around 4% in
December 2004. Achieving
this requires no tightening of
monetary conditions.
Fiscal policy has restricted abilities to adjust over the short-term,
and monetary policy has no power to speed up disinflation, due
to the constraints implied by the exchange rate band. Therefore,
the Monetary Council perceives a need to interpret the inflation
target set for 2004 in the context of monetary policy’s limited lati-
tude. Accordingly, the Monetary Council accommodates an
around 4% rate of inflation at end-2004. Thus, there is no need to
change the current monetary conditions.
Budapest, 10th of February 2003
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Monetary Council
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Summary table of projections
Summary table of projections
Percentage changes on a year earlier unless otherwise indicated
2001 2002 2003 2004
Actual data
Estimates Forecasts
Nov. New Nov. New Nov. New
CPI
December 6.8 5.3 4.8 4.6 5.2 4.2 4.0
Annual average 9.2 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.2 4.3 4.6
Economic growth
External demand 0.8 –1.9 (–1.0)–(–0.9)–(–0.8) 4.7 2.4–3.9–5.0 6.2 3.0–4.8–6.5
Manufacturing value added 1.6 –0.5 (–0.3)–0.2–0.7 4.7 2.0–3.5–4.5 7.0 2.5–4.2–6.0
Household consumption1 5.6 9.4 8.9–9.1–9.2 7.3 5.4–6.6–7.4 3.9 3.2–4.1–5.0
Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 6.5 5.5–6.5–7.0 4.3 1.5–3.4–5.0 4.2 1.0–3.1–5.0
Domestic absorption 2.0 5.6 5.0–5.2–5.4 4.9 4.0–4.3–4.6 3.7 2.8–3.3–3.8
Exports 9.1 4.8 5.2–5.7–6.0 5.7 4.0–6.2–8.0 9.7 4.5–7.8–11.1
Imports 6.3 8.4 8–8.5–9 7.1 5.0–7.3–9.5 8.7 4.0–7.2–10.4
GDP 3.7 3.2 3.2–3.3–3.4 3.9 3.2–3.5–3.8 4.2 3.2–3.6–4.0
Current account deficit 2
As a percentage of GDP 2.2 5.2 5.5–5.6–5.7 5.5 5.2–5.7–6.1 5.2 4.7–5.2–5.7
EUR billions 1.2 3.5 3.7–3.8–3.9 4.0 3.9–4.2–4.5 4.1 3.7–4.1–4.5
General government
Demand impact 3 1.8 3.4 4.2–4.3–4.6 –1.2 (–0.2)–(–0.9)–(–1.3) –1.4 (–2.2)–(–2.4)–(–2.6)4
Labour market (private sector)5
Wage inflation 14.6 13.4 12.6–12.9–13.2 6.04 6.8–7.8–8.8 6.04 4.2–5.4–6.6
Employment 1.1 –0.2 (–0.4)–(–0.3)–(–0.2) 0.3 (–0.7)–(–0.1)–0.5 1.2 (–0.7)–0.1–0.9
Real exchange rate, manufacturing6
Annual average 8.6 11.7 10.9–11.3–11.7 (–0.2) 0.4–(–0.1)–(–0.6) (–2.2) (–0.4)–(–1.1)–(–1.8)
Q4 14.5 8.5 8.0–8.7–9.4 (–3.8) (–4.0)–(–4.5)–(–5.0) (–0.7) (0.9)– 0.2–(–0.5)
1 Household consumption expenditure
2 According to balance of payments methodology applied in 2002
3 As a percentage of GDP
4 Assumption
5 Average for manufacturing and services
6 On ULC basis, positive values denote an appreciation.
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1 Inflation
1. 1 Previous inflation projection
versus the actual rate
In December 2002, CPI inflation stood at 4.8%. Thus, the Mon-etary Council’s target set in mid-2001 for the end of last year
was achieved at approximately its central value.
Monetary policy made a major contribution to achieving
this target and bringing down the CPI by 6 percentage points
in the course of eighteen months. In addition to calculations
by Bank staff (see Section 5.2), this is also proved by the fall in
the core inflation index published by the Central Statistical
Office. Since mid-2001, core inflation, calculated by excluding
prices exogenous to monetary policy and occasionally exhib-
iting high volatility (such as the price of household energy,
unprocessed food, fuels, as well as administered prices), fell
by 5 percentage points, roughly the same rate as the CPI.
1. 1. 1 Assessment of data for 2002 Q4
A detailed look at the data for the end of last year reveals that
core inflation, which is instrumental in assessing inflation de-
velopments, amounted to 5.5% in 2002 Q4. Note, that accord-
ing to data released after the Report’s cutoff date, CPI and core
inflation stood at 4.7 and 5.3 percent in January 2003. Accord-
ing to the Bank’s preliminary assessment, the new informa-
tion is in line with developments described below.
In the final quarter there was a renewed decline in the price of
tradable goods, following an interruption in tradables disinflation
in 2002 Q3. By contrast, the price of consumer durables began
to rise for the first time since the exchange rate band of the forint
was widened. However, this does not necessarily indicate an in-
terruption in the process of exchange-rate-based disinflation.
First, following increases in September and October, the final two
months of the year saw another decline in prices, as reflected in
the seasonally adjusted data. Second, the impact of the exchange
rate on goods prices is not immediate, but unfolds gradually over
the course of several months of pass-through. Thus, the nominal
appreciation of the exchange rate, which began in May 2001 and
picked up pace significantly over the last quarter, may continue
to push prices downwards over the next few quarters.
In respect of non-durable goods prices, exchange-rate-based
disinflation continued, along with a slight fall in the rate of
inflation imported from the euro area, despite some accelera-
tion in household consumer expenditure.
Certain key factors affecting the development of prices for
market services, such as the nominal exchange rate and incomes,
Chart 1.1 CPI and core inflation
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Chart 1.2 Inflation of tradable goods prices
Annualised quarterly growth rates
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1 Inflation
demand and wage costs, inflation expectations and inflation
inertia, are controlled indirectly by monetary policy. In the fourth
quarter, inflation in this category did not accelerate further, de-
spite the fact that the nowcasts for household net incomes and
consumer spending indicate faster growth in 2002 Q3 and Q4.
The differential between the inflation rates of tradables and
market service prices did not continue to widen, in spite of
the ongoing process of exchange-rate-based disinflation. This
may be due to a drop in the relative price of tradables, and that
of durables in particular, in relation to the price of services,
channelling demand towards tradables and reducing growth
in demand for services.
Factors exogenous to monetary policy also have a major im-
pact on food prices, in addition to the forint’s nominal exchange
rate, demand factors and wage costs. The price level for this
category edged up slightly, due primarily to higher unprocessed
food prices. However, the increase seen during the final three
months of 2002 did not feed through into processed food prices.
This is partly due to a lag of several months until a change in
unprocessed food prices feeds through to processed foods,
which may cause the effect of the third-quarter price falls to be
significant. Furthermore, the fourth-quarter upsurge in agricul-
tural producer prices and unprocessed food prices may be in-
terpreted as a correction of the sharp fall in prices in the sum-
mer. Consequently, the feed-through effect may also be milder.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the strong forint also exerted
downward pressure on inflation in processed food prices.
In addition to the forint/euro exchange rate, motor fuel
prices were also greatly influenced by exogenous factors, such
as the world price for oil and the euro/dollar exchange rate.
On the whole, these factors and the July increase in the excise
duty caused the level of motor fuel prices to increase in 2002.
Due to the appreciation of the forint exchange rate, however,
in the final quarter of 2002 motor fuel prices were at the level
seen in mid-2001.
Tobacco and alcohol prices are mainly influenced by regu-
latory changes in the tax regime. The impact of the August in-
crease in the excise duty on tobacco was still being felt during
the final quarter, since it usually takes several months until
stocks are run down.
There was no fundamental change in regulated goods prices
in Q4, but the prices of some regulated telecommunication
services rose slightly.
1. 1. 2 Previous projection versus actual inflation
In 2002 Q4, CPI inflation was 0.3 percentage points lowerthan projected in November. The Bank’s projection for core
inflation, containing items relevant to monetary policy, ex-
ceeded the rate of actual increases by 0.2 percentage points.
As noted in the November Report, adopting a cautious ap-
proach, the Bank uses the highest available oil price projec-
tion for the full forecast horizon. As oil prices dropped stead-
ily from October, it therefore came as no surprise that the rule-
based forecast overstated inflation even over the short term, at
December 2002. In fact, when the Bank issued the November
Report oil prices had already been falling, causing a short term
downward risk to the CPI forecast which was noted in the text
of Chapter 1.2 accordingly.
Chart 1.3 Inflation of market services prices
Annualised quarterly growth rates
Chart 1.4 Food prices
Chart 1.5 Motor fuel prices
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1 Inflation
Prices of tradables, market services, unprocessed food, mar-
ket-priced energy, and alcohol and tobacco, rose broadly as
projected in November. In contrast, processed food prices in-
creased at a slower-than-projected pace, along with prices for
motors fuels and regulated goods. In the following, an analy-
sis of whether the difference is due to the assumptions used or
other factors is presented.
The error in the projection for motor fuel prices can be at-
tributed to the difference between the November assumptions
and the actual data for exogenous factors, such as the strength-
ening of the forint against the euro and the dollar, as well as to
the decline in oil prices.
Processed food prices rose at a more moderate rate than
projected, thanks to the milder-than-expected feed-through of
the autumn increases in unprocessed food prices. Another
contributory factor may have been the appreciation of the
forint, since a stronger forint tends to exert downward pres-
sure on the price of imported goods, while also holding do-
mestic producer prices in check.
The October and November increases in regulated tel-
ephone and postal services prices led to surprise inflation rela-
tive to the Bank’s projection. However, this was more than off-
set by the moderating effect on the price index of the overall
regulated product group, as the increase in central and district
heating prices expected by the Bank for the fourth quarter was
not implemented.
1. 2 CPI forecast
The MNB’s current projection for CPI inflation is 5.2% atend-2003, and 4.0% at end-2004. Accordingly, the central
inflation projection is 0.6 percentage points higher at end-2003,
and 0.2 percentage points lower at end-2004 than the corre-
sponding values published in the November Report.
In contrast with November, the current forecast for key la-
bour market developments, underlying the inflation projec-
tion, is based on the Bank’s own forecast rather than an as-
sumed, conditional path. This has raised the current projec-
tion for private sector wage growth in 2003 relative to the pre-
vious projection. By contrast, the current forecast for wage
growth in 2004 is lower than in November, due partly to the
effect of the strong real appreciation of 2001-2002 and the fact
that economic growth is now forecast to be much slower in
2004.
The Bank has also changed its assumptions for some of the
exogenous factors, such as the forint/euro exchange rate, the
world oil price, the dollar/euro exchange rate as well as regu-
latory changes, relative to November. At the request of the
Monetary Council, the current forecast for the exchange rate is
set at HUF/EUR 245. This is slightly weaker than the assump-
tion used in the November Report. While the oil price assump-
tion derived from average prices in January has been signifi-
cantly raised, this is largely offset by the weakening in the USD/
EUR exchange rate, which is calculated in a similar way. On
the whole, the oil price assumption expressed in euros has risen
marginally. As regards regulatory changes, decisions made
public for this year have been incorporated into the relevant
Table 1.1 Central inflation projection and actual data in 2002 Q4
Weight
Actual November Differ-
data projection ence Effect of
difference
% on CPI
Food 19.0 2.4 3.0 –0.6 –0.12
Unprocessed 6.2 –1.0 –0.9 0.00 0.00
Processed 12.8 4.0 4.9 –0.9 –0.12
Tradables 27 2.0 2.0 0.0 –0.01
Market services 19.4 9.0 8.9 0.1 0.01
Market-priced energy 1.5 4.0 4.0 0.1 0.00
Motor fuels 5.2 8.2 11.4 -3.2 –0.17
Alcohol and tobacco 9.1 11.0 11.1 0.0 0.00
Regulated prices 18.9 3.0 3.3 -0.3 –0.05
CPI 100.0 4.8 5.1 -0.3 –0.29
Core inflation 68.2 5.5 5.7 -0.2 –0.15
Percentage changes
on a year earlier
Percent-
age point
Table 1.2 Assumptions of the November projection and actual data
for 2002 Q4
Assumptions
of the Actual
November data
projection
Forint/euro exchange rate (HUF) 243.6 239.3
Dollar/euro exchange rate (cent) 98.2 100.1
Brent oil price (dollar/barrel) 27.6 26.8
Imported inflation of tradables prices (%)* 1.1 1.2
Household consumption expenditure (%)** 11.5 10.2
Gross private sector wages growth (%)** 12.9 12.7
* Tradables price inflation in the euro area, average of annualised month-on-
month growth rates (NewCronos code: igoodsxe).
** Annual average growth rates.
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assumptions. Accordingly, in 2004 regulated prices are assumed
to increase at roughly the same rate as the average of market
services prices.
The main reason that the current inflation projection for end-
2003 is higher than published in November is that, in contrast
to the time of the previous Report, the current projection is no
longer based on a conditional wage path. As a result, the 2003
wage forecast is now higher than it was previously. Additional
factors behind this year’s higher projected inflation are the
higher oil price assumption in euro terms and the effect of the
weaker exchange rate of the forint.
At the same time, the inflation forecast for end-2004 has been
slightly revised down from the November rate. This is due to
the fact that wage inflation and economic growth are forecast
to be slower than previously, and fiscal demand is expected to
contract more sharply. In addition, the forecast based on the
regulatory assumption for end-2004 has been revised down
from that in November, due to technical factors.
In the central projection, the CPI exceeds the upper limit of
the inflation target range by 0.7 percentage points at the end
of this year, and remains within the target range at end-2004.
At the same time, there is a slight downside risk to the central
inflation projection in both years. Thus, even though the cen-
tral projection is higher than in November, it is accompanied
by downside risks to inflation.
Chart 1.6 Fan chart of the inflation projection*
* The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the outcomes
around the central projection. The entire coloured area covers 90%
of all probabilities. Outside the central projection (centred around
the mode), the bands represent 15% probability each. The central
band contains the central projection (as the mode) with a 30%
probability. The uncertainty intervals have been estimated relying
on the Bank’s historical forecasting errors and the uncertainties
perceived by the Monetary Council regarding the current forecast.
The year-end points represent the fixed inflation targets (7%, 4.5%,
3.5% and 3.5% for December 2001–2004), while the straight lines
mark the ±1% tolerance intervals. Based on an agreement between
the Hungarian Government and the MNB, the December 2003
inflation target has been reinterpreted as an inflation rate of 4.5%
or below.
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Table 1.3 Central projection for the CPI*
     
Food 10.9 1.9 2.2 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.7
Unprocessed 6.2 -1.7 0.6 7.1 5.7 6.6 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.7 4.7
Processed 12.8 3.6 2.8 3.0 4.3 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.0 4.7 4.7
Tradables 27.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9
Market services 19.4 9.0 8.7 7.9 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.6 5.5
Market-priced energy 1.5 5.3 7.0 8.0 8.0 7.4 6.6 4.5 3.2 2.6 2.4
Vehicle fuels 5.2 12.3 9.1 5.2 5.2 6.0 4.7 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.3
Alcohol and tobacco 9.1 9.7 9.8 9.6 7.6 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.3 6.9 6.8
Regulated prices 18.9 3.6 4.9 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.5 6.9 5.5 5.3 5.3
CPI 100 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.0
Core inflation estimate 68.2 5.3 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.7
Inflation differential*** 7.2 6.9 6.1 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.6
Annual average 5.2 4.6
* CPI inflation data for January 2003 (4.7%) published after finalising our Report, was fundamentally in line with our forecast.
** The weights refer to the year 2002. The weights applied for 2003 are not available at this forecasting phase.
*** Market services and tradables price inflation differential.
Projection
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec.
2003 2004
Weight
(%)**
Table 1.4 Assumptions underlying the central projection
November 2002 projection Current projection Difference
2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
Forint/euro exchange rate* 243.6 245.0 +0.6%
Dollar/euro exchange rate (cent)** 98.2 106.2 +8.2%
Brent oil price (dollar/barrel)** 27.6 31.2 +13%
Imported inflation (average of annualised monthly growth rates)*** 1.1 1.1 0.0
Gross private sector wages growth (annual average, %) 6.0 6.0 7.8 5.4 +1.8 –0.6
Household consumption expenditure (annual average, %) 7.3 3.9 6.6 4.1 –0.7 +0.2
* The assumption of the Monetary Council.
** The assumption is derived as the average of the values for January.
*** Euroarea-11 industrial goods inflation, Eurostat NewCronos code: igoodsxe.
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1. 2. 1 Impact of the forint’s exchange rate
on inflation
In the current forecast, the assumption for the forint/euro ex-
change rate was made on the basis of the Monetary Council’s
assumptions. This resulted in an exchange rate of HUF 245 to
the euro, slightly weaker than in the November projection, caus-
ing the inflation projection to increase.
Over the short term, the weaker forint may initially exert
upward pressure on the price of vehicle fuels, and the domes-
tic prices of certain imported tradables and food products, via
higher import prices. The current exchange rate assumption
is, however, still considerably stronger than the rates preced-
ing exchange rate band widening, which in the medium run
points towards a continuing disinflation process.
The current projection has also taken account of other
longer-term disinflationary effects of the strong forint, expected
to unfold via two main channels. First, as firms adjust nominal
wages to declining corporate revenues, the stronger exchange
rate exerts downward pressure on CPI inflation through its
negative effect on aggregate demand. Second, in the absence
of sufficient wage adjustment, pricing mark-ups fall initiating
a decline in firms’ output and labour demand. This again,
through rising unemployment, leads to an aggregate demand-
side disinflationary pressure.
In accordance with the developments noted above, the pro-
jection for tradables prices shows a slight increase in 2003 Q1,
followed by a steady downward trend until early 2004. By con-
trast, from 2004 on, tradables price inflation remains flat at a
low level, but no deflation is expected for tradables as a whole.
However, durable industrial goods prices, which are the most
sensitive to exchange rate strengthening, are projected to con-
tinue to deflate, consistent with developments over the past
one and a half years.
Disinflationary pressures from the strong exchange rate have
a major bearing on projected inflation in market services prices,
resulting in a downward trend over the entire forecast hori-
zon. Steady disinflation in this category is also reinforced by
the continuous moderation of the wage inflation path. In ad-
dition, the projection, which is slightly lower than in Novem-
ber, is supported by the findings of the Bank’s latest survey on
the goods composition of household consumption expendi-
ture. The survey suggests that, over the past two years, expan-
sion in household demand has been increasingly focused on
consumer durables, while the relative weight of demand for
services, and hence the inflationary pressure of stronger de-
mand on services prices, has declined (see Section 2.1 on
household consumption).
Developments in the inflation differential are determined
by two trends. On the one hand, exchange-rate-based
disinflation causes the differential to widen, as the exchange
rate exerts stronger disinflationary pressure on tradables
prices. Accordingly, the inflation differential widened last year.
On the other hand, as tradables prices fall at a faster pace than
services prices, domestic demand is attracted more towards
tradable goods, which may stimulate a narrowing of the infla-
tion differential. Hence, the current projection is for a down-
ward trend in the inflation differential over the entire forecast
horizon.
Chart 1.7 Projection for tradables inflation
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
Chart 1.8 Projection for market services price inflation
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
Chart 1.9 Projection for the inflation differential
between market services and tradables
Difference between annual indices
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1. 2. 2 Effects of high oil prices and the weak
exchange rate of the US dollar
As per the rule mentioned earlier, the Bank’s assumptions for
world oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate are fixed as
the averages for the final full month prior to the Report, in this
case, January 2003. The outcome is a very high oil price and a
relatively weak dollar exchange rate assumption.
Over the short term, the high price of oil on the global mar-
ket boosts CPI inflation via the price of motor fuels, while over
the longer term, it also feeds through into the price of energy-
intensive products (in particular, market services and certain
processed food products) by pushing up costs. By contrast,
the weaker dollar exerts disinflationary pressures via the same
channels. In sum, the combined effect of these two factors
(changes of oil price in euros) is upward pressure on infla-
tion.
The oil price assumption is usually based on a number of
information sources, providing alternative profiles in addition
to the assumption derived using the constant oil price rule.
The current alternative paths for oil prices consist of one de-
rived from the oil futures prices at the London-based IPE mar-
ket and one obtained from the latest Consensus Economics
forecast (survey on 20 January 2003).1  Both alternative paths
for oil are lower than the constant path underlying the central
projection, and project declining oil prices through to the end
of the forecast horizon. The downward inflationary effects of
a declining oil price path are accounted for among the uncer-
tainties surrounding the central inflation projection.
1. 2. 3 Impact of fiscal policy on inflation
The impact of fiscal policy on inflation appears indirectly in
the fiscal stance of the general government and directly in de-
velopments in administered prices and indirect taxation. Reli-
able information on these effects is mainly available for 2003,
whereas for lack of official information, the Bank can only make
a number of relatively simple and transparent assumptions for
developments in 2004.
The fiscal stance is expected to be inflationary in 2003, due
primarily to the effect of public sector wage increases imple-
mented in the second half of 2002 and rising household trans-
fer payments. Fiscal expansion affecting household incomes
exerts significant inflationary pressure by boosting domestic
household demand, a key contributing factor in inflation de-
velopments in 2003. According to the Bank’s calculations, this
inflationary effect is estimated to be around 1.3 percentage
points for 2003 (see Section 5.1).
Inflation in regulated prices in 2003 is calculated using the price
increases prescribed by the Budget and related Acts. With re-
gard to indirect taxes, the planned increase in the excise duty
on tobacco in 2003 Q2 would cause the price of tobacco prod-
ucts to rise by 10.6%, which is fully incorporated into the cur-
rent projection. All in all, the 2003 projection for regulated
Chart 1.10 Alternative assumptions
for the Brent oil price
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1 Both alternative paths are initially calculated for WTI oil prices. In preparing the
forecasts, however, the Bank transforms WTI prices to Brent prices, taking into ac-
count that WTI prices are systematically higher than Brent prices by an average of
1.8 USD/barrel.
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prices as annual averages is 0.4 percentage points higher than
predicted in November.2
The Bank has made a simple assumption for 2004, namely
that annual price increases within this product group will be
roughly equal to the rate of inflation of market services prices.3
Note that in the absence of specific information, changes in
indirect taxes on tobacco products and vehicle fuels in 2004
are expected to move in line with average CPI inflation.
1. 2. 4 Uncertainty surrounding the central
projection
The probability distribution of the central projection has been
estimated relying on the Bank’s historical forecasting errors
and the uncertainties perceived by the Monetary Council. The
extent of the uncertainty regarding the current projection cor-
responds to the standard deviation of the former forecasting
errors, while the shape of the probability distribution reflects
a small downside risk to inflation relative to the central pro-
jection. The slight downward asymmetry around the central
projection stems from developments in world oil prices in
2003, as well as oil prices and prospective excise duty rises in
2004.
The uncertainty about prospective oil prices constitutes a
downside risk to inflation both at end-2003 and 2004. This is
because the oil price assumption underlying the projection is
fixed at the recent very high level over the entire forecast hori-
zon. Although it cannot be ruled out that oil prices continue to
rise over the short term, the medium-to-long-term scenario calls
for oil prices to decrease.
This is reflected in the Bank’s alternative assumptions,
which show oil prices gradually declining over the forecast
horizon. Assuming that actual oil prices followed an alterna-
tive path similar to either the one derived from futures prices
or the Consensus Economics oil price, the inflation projec-
tions for end-2003 and end-2004 may be lower than the cur-
rent projection by 0.3–0.4 and 0.2–0.3 percentage points, re-
spectively.
With regard to 2004, the prospective rise in the excise du-
ties on tobacco and vehicle fuels also constitutes a downside
risk to inflation. The central projection is calculated using the
neutral assumption that excise duties will increase at the same
rate as inflation, which, consistent with the Monetary Coun-
cil’s assessment of risk, is associated with a downside risk.
Relative to the central projection, the risk to private sector
wage inflation is of the customary extent. In the Monetary
Council’s view, the balance of risks is neutral in both years. As
the risk to wage inflation, an instrumental factor in the assess-
Table 1.5 Bounds of the bands in the fan chart
(changes on a year earlier)
90% 60% 30% Central path 30% 60% 90%
lower lower lower (mode) upper upper upper
2003 Q1 3.8 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.5 6.0
2003 Q2 3.3 4.1 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.5
2003 Q3 3.3 4.4 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.4
2003 Q4 2.7 3.9 4.6 5.2 5.7 6.2 7.2
2004 Q1 2.4 3.7 4.5 5.2 5.7 6.3 7.4
2004 Q2 1.7 3.2 4.1 4.8 5.3 6.0 7.2
2004 Q3 0.9 2.6 3.5 4.3 4.9 5.6 6.8
2004 Q4 0.5 2.2 3.2 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.8
2 The fact that the projection for 2003 is higher than in November can be largely
ascribed to upward revisions to the forecasts for local and long-distance transport
fees, district heating and electricity prices, as a result of newly acquired official
information.
3 The projected increase in regulated prices in the first half of 2004 is higher than
the Bank’s previous forecast in November. This is due to the prolonged effect of the
planned increase in the price of piped gas in May 2003, which, in the previous
forecast round, was expected to occur in January. For the second half of 2004, how-
ever, the Bank expects relatively low annual price increases so that the rule previ-
ously laid down, i.e. that the annual average increase in regulated prices should be
relatively in line with the rate of inflation in market services, will likely apply.
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ment of risk, has a symmetrical distribution, the fan chart has
only a minor downward asymmetry for both years.
The table below illustrates revisions to the inflation projec-
tion in the event of shocks to the key explanatory variables.
Table 1.6 Changes in the central projection under different scenarios
Factors Scenarios*
Deviation from central projection**
(percentage points)
December 2003 December 2004
Private sector wage growth One percentage point higher gross wage growth on average in both years 0.26 0.31
Changes in regulated prices One percentage point higher rate of increase in both years 0.22 0.22
Forint/euro exchange rate One per cent weaker exchange rate over the full forecast horizon 0.14 0.07
Brent oil price 10 per cent higher price throughout the full forecast horizon 0.22 0.02
Imported inflation Half a per cent higher price level over the full forecast horizon 0.11 0.03
* For each scenario, shocks are assumed to occur from 2003 Q1.
** Difference of year-on-year indices.
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2. 1 Demand
The Bank has revised up slightly its forecast of economicgrowth in 2002, while revising down its forecasts for the
current year and the next year, compared to the figures pub-
lished in the November Report. This can be attributed to three
major factors. First, the forecast for external demand is now
somewhat more pessimistic, owing to the assumption of higher
oil prices. Second, the Bank expects lower corporate earnings
to depress corporate activity more strongly, mainly on account
of the real appreciation of the forint. Finally, the effects of the
2002 fiscal expansion will continue to be felt in 2003; how-
ever, according to the Bank’s assumptions, 2004 will see sub-
stantial fiscal restriction. Taking account of all these factors,
the Bank has revised down its forecast of GDP growth in 2003
to 3.5% and to 3.6% for 2004.
The Bank now estimates that the decline in external demand
in 2002 was less severe than previously assumed. Although it
seems the worst is past, activity is only expected to recover
modestly. The Bank’s forecasts for external demand are more
pessimistic for this year and the next, due to higher oil prices
and the uncertain world economic outlook.
In 2002, the fiscal expansionary effect on demand turned
out to be higher than previously anticipated – the Bank calcu-
lates it to have been 4.3% as a proportion of GDP. This issue
will be discussed in more detail in the section on general gov-
ernment. The fiscal contractionary effect in 2003 has been re-
vised down slightly relative to the previous forecast, while for
2004, it is assumed that fiscal policy will fall in line with the
Government’s medium-term economic programme (PEP).
Hence, the Bank expects the contractionary impact to be 2.4%
in 2004, due to this year’s lower-than-expected contraction of
demand. This is somewhat higher relative to the forecast in the
November issue of the Report. It is thought that the contractio-
nary impact on demand will be reflected primarily in the Gov-
ernment’s fixed investment programme.
Household demand is currently forecast to continue grow-
ing vigorously in 2003, although at a slower rate than last year.
The Bank’s forecast for household consumption expenditure
in 2003 has been revised down relative to the November Re-
port, explained by the decline in the demand for labour in
2003 and a pick-up in 2004. One reason for this is that wage
developments will likely feed through to consumption ex-
penditure with some delay, and that the higher expected in-
crease in wages will continue to be reflected in household
demand in 2004.
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Growth in fixed capital formation is expected to lose mo-
mentum gradually, as a result of opposing developments. On
the one hand, corporate investment is projected to accelerate,
in line with the recovery in external demand. On the other
hand, households’ investment, typically in residential property,
will remain flat at a high level. In addition, in accordance with
the fiscal path assumed for 2004, government investment ac-
tivity is expected to decline markedly.
Lower-than-expected external demand and appreciation of
the real exchange rate will likely affect goods exports in both
2003 and 2004. The reason for the Bank’s current higher fore-
cast for whole-economy exports in 2003 compared to the No-
vember Report is that developments in travel and exports of
other services are influenced by different underlying trends
in contrast to those in goods exports. In the Bank’s assump-
tion, the negative effects of the real appreciation on tourism
were mainly concentrated in 2002.
In presenting the major components of GDP growth, it
should be stressed that in the current forecast the change in
inventories (the statistical error therein) is treated as a balanc-
ing item between the production and uses sides, and cannot
be linked to business activity cycles. Industrial and commer-
cial inventories will be analysed from the perspectives of the
business cycle in the section on inventory investment.
The Bank forecasts Hungary’s GDP to have grown at a year-
on-year rate of 3.7% in the fourth quarter of 2002. The forecast
for economic growth is now lower over the longer horizon than
it was in November, as a combined effect of less favourable
external business conditions relative to the previous assump-
tion, the real appreciation experienced in 2001–2002 and the
fiscal tightening assumed to take place in 2004.
2. 1. 1 External demand
The slow recovery in the global economy, and particularly in
the European economy, continued in 2002 Q3. The Bank’s
analysis suggests that the European business cycle has bot-
tomed out already, and uncertainties only remain in respect of
the extent of recovery.
GDP growth was uninterrupted in Hungary’s major trading
partners in the first three quarters of 2002, although its rate
was fairly subdued. This was mainly due to growth in exports
rather than stronger domestic demand – hence, import de-
mand, which is crucial for Hungarian goods and services, re-
mained weak. Nevertheless, third-quarter imports in Germany,
accounting for a major share of Hungarian exports, surged
unexpectedly, and thus effective external demand rose signifi-
cantly. 4
The prospective risks in 2003, and the development of busi-
ness confidence indices as well as other leading indicators, such
as the order books and production expectations, however, sug-
gest that over the medium term the increase in external de-
mand in 2002 Q3 will prove a one-off event and that external
demand will fall to, or a little below, the path previously fore-
Table 2.1 Sectoral breakdown of the fixed capital formation*
Annual percentage changes
Weights** 2001 2002 2003 2004
%* Estimate Projection
Corporate sector 63 1.0 (–4)–(–2) (–1)–3 3–8
General government 16 –6.9 18–23 3-9 (–5)–5
Households 21 21.4 20–25 3-9 (–4)–6
Gross fixed capital
formation 100 3.2 5.5–7.0 1.5–5.0 1.0–5.0
* Investments data, which might differ from those of Gross fixed capital
formation. see Manual to Hungarian economic statistics
** for 2002, MNB calculation.
Table 2.2 Growth in GDP and its components
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Actual Estimate Projection
2001 2002 2003 2004
Household consumption 5.0 8.0 5.9 3.6
Household final cons. expenditure 5.6 9.1 6.6 4.1
Social transfers in kind 2.5 3.5 2.8 1.3
Public consumption 4.4 3.0 2.0 1.5
Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 6.5 3.4 3.1
‘Final domestic sales’* 4.6 7.1 4.9 3.3
Inventory investment
and other non-specified use (–41) (–50) (–30) (+5)
Domestic absorption 2.0 5.2 4.3 3.3
Exports 9.1 5.7 6.2 7.8
Imports 6.3 8.5 7.3 7.2
GDP 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.6
* Final domestic sales =household consumption + public consumption +
gross fixed capital formation
Chart 2.1 Quarterly GDP growth
Annualised percentage changes on previous quarter
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4 Import demand of Hungary’s 11 major trading partner is considered as the effec-
tive external demand for Hungarian goods exports where the weights accounted
for by the individual countries is provided by their importance in Hungarian ex-
ports.
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cast, supported by economic rationale which tends to predomi-
nate over the longer term. This translates to a decline in terms
of average growth rates for 2003 and 2004, which is also rein-
forced by the projections of large international institutions.
Due to the assumption of a persistently higher price of oil,
stemming from the geopolitical situation, and rising risk premia
in the event of a war against Iraq, the Bank expects the expan-
sion of external demand to be 3.9% in 2003 relative to the ear-
lier forecast of 4.7%. Projections indicate that imports by Hun-
gary’s major trading partners will likely begin to pick up pace
in 2003 H2.
The Bank maintains its view that this dynamics will continue
in 2004; even so there will be a considerable decline in terms
of annual average growth – in contrast with the earlier forecast
of 6.2%, the Bank now expects growth to be 4.8%.
In addition to the risks inherent in the central path, the ef-
fects of a potential war against Iraq on oil prices and risk premia
over the yields on various investments may exert downward
pressure on external demand. However, even under this sce-
nario, at the most, import growth registered by Hungary’s ma-
jor trading partners would be by 1.5 percentage points and 0.5
percentage points lower than the central path in 2003 and 2004,
respectively.
2. 1. 2 Fiscal stance
In 2002, the expansionary impact of general government on
demand amounted to approximately 4.3% of GDP, with a
contractionary impact of around 0.9% expected in 2003.5  Ac-
cordingly, for these two years the corrected SNA-based deficit
will likely turn out to be higher than anticipated. Providing that
the fiscal target in the PEP for 2004 is met, the Bank assumes a
steeper decline of 2.2%–2.6% in demand in 2004.
As mentioned above, the Bank’s previous forecasts for the
deficit for both 2002 and 2003 proved lower than it is currently
estimated. This systematic forecasting error stems from the
nature of the rules-based forecasting method. In those area of
public finances, which are fully controlled by the central gov-
ernment, the Bank only takes into account the items already
decided in the Budget Act or other laws, and does not expect
any amendments to the legislation during the legislative proc-
ess. Where there is no full government control over fiscal de-
velopments, the Bank provides cautious estimates of the ex-
tent of overruns. In contrast with this, spending by the local
governments and budgetary units turned out to be much
higher than expected in 2002. Generally, in the case of tax rev-
enues, where the Bank always employs its own macroeconomic
forecasts, the previous estimates for 2002 were met.
Based on preliminary central government data and estimates
of local government deficit and expenditures financed, the ex-
pansionary impact may have been 4.3% in 2002, in contrast
with 3.4% estimated in the November Report.
• The Bank has taken account of the change in the outstand-
ing debt of the Hungarian Railways (MÁV) and some public
Chart 2.2 Business climate indicator of the euro
area (EABCI) and business confidence index of the
German Ifo Institute
Chart 2.3 Current and previous projections for
external demand
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Table 2.3 Various forecasts of effective external demand for Hungarian
goods and services
2002 2003 2004
Current Previous Current Previous Current Previous
MNB -0.9 –1.9 3.9 4.7 4.8 6.2
European
Commission* –1.1 5.9 7.1
OECD* –1.4 5.5 7.6
IMF* –0.4 5.7 n/a
*Forecasts have not been updated since the November Report.
Table 2.4 Difference between the current forecast and those
of the November Report
As a percentage of GDP
(1) (2) (2–1)
2002 2003
preliminary forecast
Consolidation with the debt
of some public companies 0.4 0.4 0.0
Open-ended expenditures, local
governments and budgetary
units spending 0.8 0.3 –0.5
Delays in the implementation
of some off-budget –0.3 0.1 0.4
Effects of certain
new information for 2003 – 0.4 0.4
Total 0.9 1.2 0.3
Change in
the fiscal
impact in
demand
Change in the level of
corrected SNA deficit
5 Fiscal demand impact is the change in the so-called corrected SNA primary bal-
ance of the general government estimated by the MNB (see Manual of Hungarian
economic data at the MNB homepage).
Present Previous
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
1
9
9
5
=
1
0
0
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
1
9
9
5
=
1
0
0
0
0
:Q
1
0
0
:Q
2
0
0
:Q
3
0
0
:Q
4
0
1
:Q
1
0
1
:Q
2
0
1
:Q
3
0
1
:Q
4
0
2
:Q
1
0
2
:Q
2
0
2
:Q
3
0
2
:Q
4
0
3
:Q
1
0
3
:Q
2
0
3
:Q
3
0
3
:Q
4
0
4
:Q
1
0
4
:Q
2
0
4
:Q
3
0
4
:Q
4
20 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
2 Economic activity
transport companies, thus explaining 0.4% of the differ-
ence.6  This consolidation was necessary anyway, as, in con-
trast with the earlier steady rise in debt which would have
only increased the level of corrected SNA-based deficit, in-
debtedness began to rise strongly in 2002, with a resulting
upward effect on the demand impact. The demand impact
can only be captured in continuous accounting, instead of
recording at the time of debt assumption which is only re-
flected in the official data every two or three years retro-
spectively. This methodological change has altered both the
past data and the current forecast.
• Additional expenditure due to fiscal developments resulted
in a 0.8% expansion of demand.7  On balance, the effect on
revenues of macroeconomic developments through the tax
bases met the Bank’s expectation. However, calculated on a
gross basis, i.e. excluding refunds, it fell short of the plan-
ning base of 2003 tax revenue, and it is likely to reduce this
year’s revenues on its own.
• Based on partial information, some off-budget expenditures
turned out to be less than expected and was carried forward
to 2003. This resulted in savings amounting to 0.2%–0.3% of
GDP.
In contrast with the contractionary impact of 1.2% of GDP as-
sumed in the November Report, the Bank now expects the
contractionary impact to be lower, at 0.9% in 2003. Last year’s
off-budget expenditure which materialised more slowly re-
duces the extent of this year’s contractionary impact by roughly
0.4%, as its larger part lowers the corrected SNA deficit of the
base period and increases that of the reference period simul-
taneously. Based on new information, the Bank has revised up
the forecast of other demand factors, which will likely reduce
the expected degree of contraction by another 0.4%. In addi-
tion, the expenditure estimates fixed in nominal terms in-
creased as a proportion of lower GDP than previously fore-
cast. However, the November forecast contained the shortfall
in tax revenue, a factor which was also reflected in the base.
Overruns in open-ended expenditure may continue this year;
however, excess expenditures by the local governments and
budgetary units in 2002 are unlikely to reoccur on a similar
order of magnitude this year. This may contract demand by
0.5% in 2003 in its own right.
There are risks around the central projection in both direc-
tions. Resulting from the nature of rule-based forecasting, in
the case of expenditure overruns due to fiscal developments,
account has been taken of the minimum amounts which can
be assumed based on past experience and that of certain items
only. However, fiscal developments may well result in open-
ended expenditure exceeding the cautious estimate, higher use
6 This adjustment was not anticipated earlier, as only partial information was avail-
able, with the Bank assuming that the increase in loans would be more or less even.
This latter assumption was not met in 2002.
7 Of excess expenditure, overruns in open-ended expenditure items (price and
housing subsidies, sick leave benefits, etc.) amounted to 0.1% of GDP. Around a half
of the some 0.5% excess expenditure on budgetary units stemmed from the use of
appropriations carried over; the contents of the rest of expenditure cannot be as-
certained. Consequently, it even may be linked with advance payments which could
not have a demand impact in 2002. Local authorities achieved a 0.2% savings on
expenses, which may mean that local government expenditure was also lower to a
similar degree, but it may have resulted in a comparable increase in local govern-
ment expenditure.
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of appropriations carried over and local authorities running
into debt, in contrast with a balanced position.
The other principle, according to which only the determi-
nations are taken into account, carries the potential of a higher
contraction of demand, as fiscal tightening may well be imple-
mented in the course of the year (for example, the freezing of
budgetary estimates or appropriations carried over). Quanti-
fying the effects of the modified tax laws is also uncertain in
the case of tax revenues. The measures may turn out to result
in a 0.1% higher revenue as a proportion of GDP than the Bank’s
calculation.
But the same rule may mean a lower contraction in the case
of off-budget corrections, as the Bank only takes into account
the items already determined and considered certain to mate-
rialise.
Overall, due to the uncertainties discussed above, the Bank
assumes the contractionary impact on demand to be between
0.2%–1.4% of GDP in 2003.
The Bank continues to assume that the deficit target set for
2004 on the basis of the PEP path will be met. Accordingly, pro-
vided that this year’s contraction amounts to 0.9%, the
contractionary impact is assumed to amount to 2.2%–2.6% in
2004, depending on whether there will be a debt assumption in
2004.8  Within the assumed fiscal adjustment affecting the entire
deficit, the Bank cannot make a detailed forecast of the likely
contractionary measures, but as a part of reducing demand, it is
likely that there will be significant reduction in fixed investment.
Revising up slightly its forecast, the Bank expects the public
sector gross wage bill to have increased by 31.8% in 2002, pri-
marily on account of higher employment. In 2003, the increase
in the yearly average wage bill is expected to be 17.6%, mainly
as a result of the full-year effect of the previous year’s wage
increases. In 2004, real wages are expected to increase by
around a half of the increase in GDP in the larger part of the
general government sector, which, including the full-year ef-
fect on 2004 of this year’s measures, is likely to ensure an in-
crease commensurate with that of GDP.
Based on preliminary data, transfers to households in cash
are thought to have increased by 20% in nominal terms in 2002,
somewhat more strongly than the previous forecast. One-off
transfers to old-age pensioners, higher family allowances and
scholarships, additional one-month family allowance, the mas-
sive increase in sick-leave benefits as well as the transfer com-
ponent of the purchases of shareholdings in agricultural co-
operatives dominated transfers to households in 2002. In ad-
dition to their full-year effect, the Bank has mainly taken into
account the implementation of measures affecting pension-
ers in 2003. Relative to last year’s high base, this year transfers
to households may increase less strongly, rising by 7.8%.
The Bank estimates broadly-defined public sector fixed in-
vestment volume to have increased by 18%–23% in 2002. Ow-
ing in part to fiscal developments (for example, the use of ap-
8 The reason behind the wide range is that, overall, it has become uncertain whether
the forecast of demand impact can be derived according to the method assumed
earlier, taking the change in the ESA-based deficit as a basis. With the methodologi-
cal change introduced which is necessary in economic terms, i.e. taking account of
some companies running up debt, the calculation of the demand impact will have
an increasing discrepancy over the short term with the ESA accounts which record
a capital transfer later, at the time of the debt assumption.
Table 2.5 Expansionary impact of general government on demand
As a percentage of GDP
2001 2002 2003 2004
Actual
Pre-
Projection Assumption
liminary
Direct impact
(Change in corrected SNA
primary balance adjusted
for the effect of pension
reform) 1.8 4.3 –0.9 –2.2–2.6
The (+) sign denotes a fiscal expansion of demand, and the (–) sign denotes a
contraction.
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propriations carried over) and in part to the accrual basis of
accounting, the CSO’s statistics will only reflect the curtailment
of estimated investment programmes in 2003 to a limited de-
gree. Consequently, fixed investment volume may increase by
up to approximately 9% in 2003. In contrast, fixed investment
volume is likely to fall by a several percentage points in 2004.
2. 1. 3 Household consumption, savings and fixed
investment
Three important factors played a role in the Bank’s formula-
tion of its forecast of consumption expenditure. First, real
wages grew significantly as an effect of the slow adjustment of
corporate nominal wage growth to disinflation and public sec-
tor wage hikes. Second, households received large government
transfers towards year-end in 2002, which contributed signifi-
cantly to growth in household disposable income. The effect
of this additional income will likely influence 2003 develop-
ments. Third, account has been taken of the likelihood of the
unemployment rate rising due to the more modest economic
growth, which, in turn, adds to households’ uncertainty, thus
reducing their propensity to consume.
Parallel with these effects, the Bank estimates the accumula-
tion rate to have risen last year, and the financial savings rate
approximately to have halved. The financial savings rate is ex-
pected to rise slightly and the accumulation rate to fall margin-
ally both in 2003 and 2004.
Household consumption expenditure is estimated to have
increased by 9.1% in 2002. Actual consumption data for Q3
has also been taken into account in estimating 2002 consump-
tion expenditure, due to which the estimate for last year is now
lower than that published in the previous Report.
However, the rate at which additional income from fiscal
sources was spent in 2002 Q4, i.e. how quickly households
adjusted their consumption to the increased income level,9
carries a significant uncertainty. Consequently, depending on
the degree to which consumption was actually smoothed, the
income shock at end-2002 has been a factor influencing the
forecast for 2003 as well.
The forecast for 2003 consumption expenditure has been
revised down relative to the November Report, with a 6.6%
volume increase expected in 2003. The fiscal income shock at
end-2002, the continued relatively high growth in corporate
sector wages and the likely increase in unemployment in 2003
and early 2004 due to more modest economic growth are fac-
tors influencing the increase in consumption expenditure in
2003. As was previously noted, the full-year effect of the extra
income at end-2002 will likely be felt in early 2003. In addi-
tion, high corporate sector real wages will also likely result in a
dynamic increase in consumption expenditure.
Compared with these two factors, the threat of rising unem-
ployment due to more modest economic growth is seen to work
in the opposite direction. A higher unemployment rate results in
Table 2.6 Household net income, consumption and investment
Annual change, %
Household
Consumption Investments
real net
expenditure volume
income*
2002 12.6 9.1 20–30
2003 6.0 6.6 5–10
2004 2.4 4.1 0–5
* Real net income has been approximated with the sum of net wage bill and
social transfers in cash.
9 At the time of writing this Report, retail turnover data are available up to only
November so statistical methods are used to estimate the whole fourth quarter. Based
on estimated data, quarterly growth in retail turnover increased in the fourth quar-
ter which is in line with the increasing quarterly growth of consumption caused by
the income shock at the end of 2002.
Chart 2.4 Household real net income and
consumption expenditure
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth
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slower growth in consumption expenditure, due to the precau-
tionary savings motivation. In other words, if households’ uncer-
tainty about their future incomes rises, then they curtail their
spending relative to their incomes. In addition, consumption
expenditure growth was lower in 2002 than the Bank expected.
The spillover effect of this is likely to be reflected in 2003 as well.
Consumption expenditure volume is expected to rise by
4.1% in 2004 for two reasons. First, the forecast for 2004 re-
flects the expectation that income growth in 2003 will likely
be higher relative to the path of wage growth outlined in the
November Report, which will be reflected gradually in con-
sumption. Second, the increase in household income will likely
continue to moderate in 2004. This is in opposition with the
expectation that the rise in the unemployment rate, the factor
responsible for the current uncertainties, will likely stop. Con-
sequently, although to a smaller extent, the growth rate of con-
sumption will decline in line with the decline in income.
An important issue from the perspective of analysing the
relationship between consumption expenditure and inflation
is the categories of consumption on which household demand
will focus. Both the different income elasticities and the sub-
stitution effect as the result of relative price changes tend to
influence the structure of consumption. Currently, the Bank
has no information which could help it to separate these two
effects. Therefore, this issue will be analysed in a more simple
way, looking at the changes in the weight of a given category
within total consumption expenditure. If the relative prices of
products change, then households will likely choose to con-
sume products which have become relatively cheaper, thereby
increasing the ratio of the given product within consumption.
However, this relationship acts in the other direction as well. If
the proportion of a product to total consumption increases,
higher demand pressure will emerge in this market segment
than the average increase in consumption, and vice versa. Shifts
in the demand for durable goods and services reflect house-
holds’ income position and expectations the best. The percent-
age share of durable goods rose within household consump-
tion expenditure in 2002, in contrast with that of services, which
fell. On balance, the increase in demand for services rose at a
slower rate than that in average consumption expenditure,
while demand for durable goods rose at an above-average rate.
In a catching-up economy, however, the share of services is
widely expected to increase as a trend. Consequently, the de-
mand for durable goods is more strongly interlinked with the
cyclical income position. The percentage share of durable goods
has been rising continuously in recent years. This is seen as the
consequence of households’ favourable income position and
income expectations. But the share of services has been falling
since end-2000 and early 2001, that is, the increase in demand
for services has been slower than the average increase in con-
sumption expenditure. Based on the above, the conclusion can
be drawn that purchasing consumer durables, which became
cheaper on average last year, was a more favourable choice for
households, thereby reducing demand for services.
Although the data on financial savings in 2002 are available,
the actual value of the savings rate still cannot be calculated
accurately, due to lack of information on total household in-
come. However, based on the available information it can be
assumed that the savings rate increased in 2002 Q4, as an ef-
Chart 2.5 Services and tradables spending as a
proportion of household consumption
expenditure*
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turnover in order for the 1995 average of services and the ratio in
the CSO’s National Accounts to be equal.
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fect of the additional income, although it may have been be-
tween 3%–3.5% in the year as a whole. This is less than half of
the savings rate in 2001. The operational savings rate fell by a
comparable measure, to around 1%–1.5%.
The Bank’s forecast of household investment has changed
little relative to the November Report. The most direct informa-
tion about developments in accumulation expenditures can be
derived from the number of completions and the number of
housing permits, which is used to forecast the number of com-
pletions. No new data on housing market developments were
released at the time the Report was being prepared; conse-
quently, the most recent information on the housing market is
based on developments in incomes and housing loans. In light
of building permits issued in 2002 Q1–Q3 and the unchanged
forecast of incomes for 2002, the Bank has not revised its fore-
cast of accumulation expenditure volume in 2003. Higher growth
in incomes in 2003 relative to the normative wage path outlined
in November may be a factor increasing the number of building
permits and, consequently, the volume of accumulation in 2004;
however, this will little influence the Bank’s earlier forecast.
2. 1. 4 Corporate investment
The combination of future sales prospects and expectations of
corporate profitability shapes the level of corporate fixed invest-
ment. Based on the slower-than-anticipated recovery in external
business activity, the strong appreciation of the real exchange
rate and the decline in corporate profitability, corporate fixed
investment activity is likely to increase at a lower rate than previ-
ously forecast. According to the Bank’s current forecast, corpo-
rate fixed investment rises by 1.5% in 2003 and by 5.6% in 2004.
The drop in corporate investments in 2001–2002 was not
unique. That this was also observed in some other small, open
European economies strongly suggests that the downturn in
world demand was a key factor behind this development (see
Section 5.4).
The level of corporate fixed investment continued to fall in
2002 Q3, a decline, which began in mid-2001 and was uninter-
rupted for the sixth consecutive quarter. Within corporate fixed
investment, the drop in manufacturing fixed investment activ-
ity, which is more sensitive to external cyclical conditions, has
been dominant, while investment activity in the services mar-
ket has continued to rise in recent quarters as a result of the
expansion of domestic demand. Manufacturing investment has
declined significantly, by some 15% over the past 18 months, a
process in which the appreciation of the real exchange has also
played a role, in addition to the subdued level of external de-
mand. However, the extent of this downturn proved much more
modest in Q3 than in earlier periods, suggesting perhaps that
the slow recovery of external business activity was already be-
ing felt in the sector.
Table 2.7 Savings rates10
2001* 2002* 2003 2004
Gross savings rate 12.5 9.5–10.5 9–11 9–11
Financial savings rate 7.0 3–3.5 3–4 3–4.5
Operational saving rates 4.0 1–1.5 1.2–2 1.5–2.5
Investment ratio 6.1 7–7.5 6.5–7.0 6.0–6.5
* Household disposable income is available to 2000 only, thus it is
approximated by wages and salaries and social transfer in cash.
Chart 2.6 Corporate fixed investment in a
breakdown by sector
Annualised quarter-on-quarter contributions to growth*
* The time series for both corporate investment and its components
are MNB estimates (see Manual to Hungarian economic statistics).
Market services = trade + hotels and restaurants + transportation,
post and telecommunications + financial services + property
services. The Chart does not plot the other components of corporate
sector fixed investment (the agriculture, mining, energy and
construction sectors).
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10 The gross savings rate consists of financial savings plus households’ investment
spending minus the ratio of capital transfers to adjusted total income. The finan-
cial savings rate is defined as the ratio of financial savings to adjusted total income.
The operational savings rate eliminates compensation for inflation from the finan-
cial savings rate. The investment ratio is the ratio of household investment spend-
ing, mostly on dwellings and garage construction, to adjusted total income. Adjusted
total disposable income includes transfers in kind and savings in pension funds, in
addition to total income.
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The information available on developments in corporate sec-
tor investment in 2002 Q4 is not conclusive. KOPINT’s fourth
quarter business survey has found that companies have a slightly
better perception of the current situation, which is consistent
with a slow recovery of external demand and strengthening
domestic manufacturing activity. By contrast, the capacity utili-
sation index has been falling steadily ever since 2002 Q2, im-
plying the absence of a sufficiently strong impulse from the
demand side to encourage firms to increase future capacities.
In addition, imports of capital goods have fallen substantially,
signalling a decline in corporate fixed capital formation, simul-
taneously with robust government and household investment
activity. These factors lead the Bank’s staff to believe that the
level of corporate investment continued to decline in the final
quarter of 2002, although at a slower pace than previously. All
in all, manufacturing investment is estimated to have declined
by 9% and corporate investment by 3% in 2002.
On the other hand, the KOPINT business survey has revealed
a drastic deterioration in Hungarian firms’ expectations, which
is likely to exert downward pressure on investment activity
during the first six months of 2003. In addition to the uncer-
tainty about the strength of an external recovery, the factors to
blame for the unfavourable perception of sales and produc-
tion prospects probably include domestic developments, such
as the continuing appreciation of the real exchange rate and
loss of confidence by suppliers adversely affected by the with-
drawal of some multinational firms. Expectations about the
outlook for capacity utilisation also turned around late last year,
as an increasing number of firms began to view their capaci-
ties as excessive relative to orders. Although business survey
data can vary widely at the time of turning points, the latest
information indicates that the risk of investment weakness
continuing in 2003 Q1 has increased significantly.
The long-term future development of corporate sector fixed
investments is shaped by a combination of three factors – the
pick-up in external demand, changes in domestic demand and
real appreciation. According to the Bank’s calculations, the real
appreciation that occurred up to end-2002 has retarded the
growth rate of manufacturing investment in 2002 and 2003. In
contrast with this, the slow recovery of external demand has
been a factor contributing to the upturn in manufacturing in-
vestment. Accordingly, manufacturing investment is expected
to be stagnant in 2003, only to pick up significantly in 2004.
The Bank anticipates that the increase in service sector fixed
investment activity will remain flat as a result of demand slow-
ing on the domestic markets and rising on the external ones;
consequently, total corporate sector fixed investment is ex-
pected to increase by 1.5% in 2003 and by 5.6% in 2004.
2. 1. 5 Inventory investment
The Bank’s inventory indicators, calculated on the basis of
whole-economy inventory data released by the CSO, paint a
controversial picture of the current state of business activity.
Examining the inventories-to-output ratios in both manufac-
turing and the total economy, one may conclude that, based on
the change in the ratio in Q3–Q4, that the Hungarian economy
has entered the upward phase of the cycle. The reason for this
is that, analysing their historical developments, inventory ratios
Chart 2.7 Current and expected capacity utilisation
in manufacturing
KOPINT survey
Chart 2.8 Forecasts of corporate fixed investment
and external demand
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rate
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tend to increase during downturns in business activity – they
rose drastically during the Russian crisis, and then more slowly
and less robustly recently, as a consequence the less unexpected
shock of the latest cyclical slowdown. By contrast, upward
phases of business cycles have been characterised by a decline
in inventories-to-output ratios, which has been the result of out-
put rising more strongly than inventories. Data for the past two
quarters show that the slow upward trend of inventory ratios
has broken, and that they have started falling, which, taking into
account previous movements in the time series, could be a sign
of an upswing in domestic business activity.
The decline in the inventory ratio in recent months, however,
has resulted from a fall in the level of stocks rather than a rise in
output exceeding that in stocks. Examining changes in the level
domestic inventories, the unevenness of the current recovery is
clearly demonstrable, which has been reflected in the Western
European export markets as well. In early 2002, the recession in
Western Europe appeared to have reached its bottom and it
seemed that the recovery would start very swiftly, even by his-
torical standards. External demand picked up, as a result of which
foreign trade came to life. This also affected the Hungarian
economy – output picked up and stock-building started.
However, the perceptible improvement in the global
economy failed to trigger an increase in domestic demand (con-
sumption and investment) in the member states of the EU,
which, in turn, caused a downturn in business and household
sentiment. Domestically, economic agents also grew uncertain
about the quick recovery, and settled in for a slow recovery of
business activity. As a result, the adjustment of domestic in-
ventories to the slower growth outlook and de-stocking began.
One good illustration of the degree of this uncertainty is that
manufacturing stocks have been falling for the second consecu-
tive quarter, a development unprecedented in earlier years. The
decline in inventory ratios caused by inventory levels, there-
fore, is much more a sign of uneasiness than of a recovery.
2. 1. 6 External trade
Over the short term, developments in external trade were con-
sistent with the expectations in the November Report; how-
ever, recent changes in external demand and domestic absorp-
tion have slightly altered the previous forecast.11
Little additional news has emerged in respect of exports in
2002 – following the high growth rate in H1, exports of goods
slowed, adjusting to the sluggish external recovery and real
appreciation. The latter has had a much faster influence on
the slowdown in growth in services exports. This has been re-
flected particularly in travel revenue.
The real appreciation of 2001–2002 will likely have its full
effect on goods exports in 2003, with a less dynamic increase
in external demand being a contributory factor on account of
the assumed higher price of oil. On balance, therefore, the in-
crease in goods exports is slightly slower in the current fore-
cast compared with the previous Report. However, annual
growth in services exports will likely be stronger in 2003 on a
Chart 2.9 Inventories-to-output ratios in
manufacturing and the whole economy
Chart 2.10 Inventory changes in manufacturing
and trade
Annualised quarter-on-quarter contributions to growth
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11 December foreign trade data will only be released on 24 February, after publica-
tion of the February Report.
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weaker 2002 base, despite the Bank continuing to anticipate
depressed travel revenues due to the strong forint exchange
rate. In addition, the Bank expects the exchange rate apprecia-
tion to have the most robust influence on exports that year,
trimming its growth rate by up to 2 percentage points relative
to the assumption of the nominal exchange rate remaining
unchanged following band widening in May 2001.
The delayed effects of real appreciation are unlikely to be
reflected in services exports in 2004, in contrast with goods
exports. Growth in external demand is expected to pick up, al-
though the Bank expects its rate to be slower relative to earlier
expectations. Consequently, the current forecast reflects a rate
of export growth which is around 2 percentage points lower.
No new events influenced developments in imports in 2002;
consequently, the Bank has left its estimate for 2002 in the pre-
vious Report unchanged. The effect of real appreciation on
imports was pronounced in 2002 – it contributed to growth in
imports through both the lower forint equivalent of import
prices and the replacement of domestically produced goods
which became relatively more expensive.
In 2003, the direct contribution of the real exchange rate to
import growth will likely wane, as goods exports will rise at a
more subdued pace due to the delayed effect of real apprecia-
tion in 2001–2002 (consequently, its implications for imports
will be lower as well). In addition, the Bank expects the growth
rate of domestic absorption to be more modest, with a drop in
household consumption, in particular.
However, in contrast to the earlier forecast, enterprises’
slower stockbuilding and fixed investment activity also needs
be taken into account. The virtually unchanged real exchange
rate will not likely fuel a further increase in imports from 2004;
and the lower expected rate of growth of domestic absorption
relative to 2003 is also likely to lower the rate of import growth.
However, external business activity and Hungarian exports,
both are expected to have gathered some momentum by that
time, and this will likely ensure comparable growth rates for
imports of goods and services in 2004 with those in 2003.
2. 1. 7 External balance
The Bank has revised its estimate of the current account defi-
cit for 2002 upwards to EUR 3.8 billion (5.6% of GDP), relative
to the previous Report. This stronger deterioration in the ex-
ternal balance has been due to the increase in the general gov-
ernment borrowing requirement.
The current account deficit is projected to amount to EUR
4.2 billion in 2003 (5.7% of GDP). Consequently, the Bank does
not expect the external financing requirement to rise further as
a proportion of GDP.12  In contrast to the assumption in the pre-
vious Report, the general government borrowing requirement
turns out much more modestly in the current forecast, with a
smaller change in the private sector’s position. Net household
savings are expected to decline further as a proportion of GDP,
given the higher expected increase in household consumption
and accumulation than that in disposable income. The shift in
Chart 2.11 Exports and imports of goods and
services
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corporate sector financing requirement cannot be explained
by cyclical movements, as the sector’s financing requirement
fell in 2002, due to the consolidation of state-owned enterprises.
The external financing requirement is expected to decline
somewhat as a proportion of GDP in 2004. In the Bank’s as-
sumption, the general government borrowing requirement will
decline in accordance with the medium-term fiscal policy ob-
jectives of the PEP; however, the private sector financing ca-
pacity is expected to fall more modestly than the former. The
corporate sector will likely take a net borrowing position, as
its accumulation will pick up considerably as a result of the
more favourable outlook for external demand.
3. 4 Output
Output of domestic enterprises in 2003 will likely fall short of
the level assumed in the November Report. This will be the com-
bined result of a slightly slower-than-expected recovery of ex-
ternal demand, the full-year effect of the deterioration in com-
petitiveness in the previous year and the cost shock caused by
the permanently high price of oil. In the Bank’s estimation,
manufacturing value added will increase by 3.5% in 2003 and
by 4.2% in 2004. Developments in market services will likely be
shaped by a combination of a gradual slowdown in domestic
demand and a pick-up in manufacturing activity. As a result, the
Bank forecasts growth of around 4%, both in 2003 and 2004.
One major feature of developments in 2002 Q3 on the pro-
duction side was that the decline in manufacturing value added,
which started at end-2000, clearly came to an end, in accord-
ance with the Bank’s expectation. Consequently, manufactur-
ing also contributed positively to the upturn in output, in ad-
dition to robustly rising market services and construction. The
Bank’s forecast for the start of the recovery was uncertain at
the time of the November Report; however, based on the strong
growth observed in Q3, manufacturing seems likely to have
passed through the trough of its decline in early 2002.
The preceding month’s data on gross manufacturing output
indicate a slow but steady improvement in industrial activity. The
robust growth in 2002 Q1, in which individual factors also played
a role, in addition to the pick-up on external business conditions,
was followed by stagnation in Q2. This was consistent with eco-
nomic developments in Western Europe, where expectations of
a fast recovery were replaced by general uneasiness and prepa-
rations for a slow recovery in mid-2002 (for developments in
Western European sentiment indicators, see the section on ex-
ternal demand). Since September, however, there has been slow,
but steady growth in domestic manufacturing, along with the
expansion of external demand. This steady growth is expected
to have continued in the last month of the previous year and
accordingly, gross output is now estimated to have grown by
around 3.5% and value added by around 0.5% in 2002.13
Despite the recent balanced growth in industry, domestic en-
terprises currently do not appear to be confident that the
economy has indeed entered the upward phase of the business
Table 2.8 Current account deficit and financing capacity of sectors
As a percentage of GDP
2001 2002 2003 2004
actual data estimate projection
I. General government* (-5.0) (-9.2) (-7.7) (-5.2)
II. Private sector (1+2) 3.5 3.9 2.4 0.4
1. Households 5.2 2.5 2.2 1.9
2. Corporate sector** (-1.7) 1.4 0.2 (-1.5)
Financing requirement (I.+II.)*** (-1.5) (-5.3) (-5.3) (-4.8)
Current account balance (-2.2) (-5.6) (-5.7) (-5.2)
– in EUR billions (-1.2) (-3.8) (-4.2) (-4.1)
BOP projection is based on the methodology used in 2002.
* Specially constructed indicator to describe the net saving position of general
government, which is different from the general government balance.
** Financial and non-financial corporations combined. Government spending
on motorway construction is included in data on the general government
sector.
*** On a cash-flow basis. The external financing requirement also includes
both the current and capital account balances.
Chart 2.12 Composition of the production side of
GDP*
Annualised quarter-on-quarter contributions to growth
* Other sectors such as mining, energy and public sector are not
shown.
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the Bank’s view of weak, but balanced growth.
Chart 2.13 Cyclical position of Hungarian
manufacturing
Based on firms’ assessment of their own position
Source: KOPINT corporate business sentiment survey. The axis of
the chart indicates the deviation of answers from long-term trend
considering the KOPINT business survey questions about current
and future outlook of own business position.
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cycle. According to a survey conducted by KOPINT, firms’ ex-
pectations of their own position and the prospects for output
both deteriorated in 2002 Q3.14  The path of the current cyclical
slowdown is being compared with that of the Russian crisis, which
was also an external demand shock on the chart plotting the cur-
rent assessment and changes in future expectations. The chart
provides clear evidence that corporate sentiment moved simi-
larly at the time of the Russian crisis up to 2002 Q3. From mid-
2001, future expectations, one of the components of the rapidly
deteriorating sentiment from end-2000, started to improve, fol-
lowed by a catch-up in current assessment as well. However, the
actual data for 2002 Q3 and Q4 resulted in a break in this posi-
tive trend, showing a decline in future expectations in parallel
with an improvement in current assessment. The fact that this
combination of current and future expectations is a feature of
cyclical downswing clearly demonstrates the magnitude of cur-
rent uncertainty. This negative turn appears to underline the
Bank’s assumption that recovery from the current cyclical
slowdown will be a slower and more volatile process compared
to the recovery from the shock caused by the Russian crisis.
In forecasting the long-term growth rate of manufacturing,
the Bank has taken into account the negative impact on com-
petitiveness of the real appreciation up to end-2002, in addition
to developments in external demand. According to the Bank’s
calculations, this effect will retard growth in manufacturing out-
put strongly in 2003 and somewhat more modestly in 2004. In
addition, the Bank expects external demand to pick up more
slowly in 2003–2004 than foreseen in the November Report. Con-
sequently, growth in manufacturing output will likely fall short
of the earlier forecast. Manufacturing value added is currently
expected to grow by 3.5% in 2003 and by 4.2% in 2004.
Output of market services in 2002 Q3 turned out to be a
little lower than the Bank had forecast. The sectoral breakdown
of output clearly shows that the contributions to growth of
trade, and hotels and restaurants, two sectors directly influ-
enced by household consumption, have been falling gradu-
ally, in contrast with financial services which have been pick-
ing up more and more momentum.
The Bank expects future developments in market services to
continue to be dominated by the opposing effects resulting from
the decline in domestic demand and a strengthening of manu-
facturing activity. Based on this, market services are currently
forecast to grow by 3.9% in 2003 and by around 4% in 2004.
Robust growth in domestic construction activity continued
in 2002 Q3; however, there have recently been increasing signs
suggesting that this upturn in construction may be running
out of steam. The sector’s stock of new orders has been falling
gradually since May, with the level of gross output declining
since September. The Bank expects the current upturn in con-
struction activity to continue to weaken in the future, consist-
ent with the slowdown in public sector investments and the
slower increase in home construction. Accordingly, construc-
tion output is expected to have grown by 15% in 2002. Growth
in the sector’s output is expected to be around 11% and 4% in
2003 and 2004, respectively.
Chart 2.15 Gross manufacturing output and value
added
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
Chart 2.17 Growth in market services in a
breakdown by sector
Annualised quarter-on-quarter contributions to growth
14 Earlier examinations showed that expectations of firms about their position and
future developments in output are good predictors of manufacturing activity. For
more details, see MNB Background Study No. 3/2002.
Chart 2.14 Cyclical position of Hungarian
manufacturing
Based on firms’ assessment of current and future production
Source: as above. The axis of the chart indicates the deviation of
answers from long-term trend considering the KOPINT business
survey questions about current and future outlook of production.
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Chart 2.16 Forecasts of manufacturing value added
and external demand
Manufacturing value added Manufacturing gross output
35 35
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
-5 -5
-10 -10
-15 -15
9
5
:Q
1
9
5
:Q
4
9
6
:Q
3
9
7
:Q
2
9
8
:Q
1
9
8
:Q
4
9
9
:Q
3
0
0
:Q
2
0
1
:Q
1
0
1
:Q
4
0
2
:Q
3
0
3
:Q
2
0
4
:Q
1
0
4
:Q
4
P
er
ce
n t
P
er
ce
nt
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
1
9
9
5
=
1
0
0
125
135
145
155
165
175
1
9
9
5
=
1
0
0
9
9
:Q
1
9
9
:Q
3
0
0
:Q
1
0
0
:Q
3
0
1
:Q
1
0
1
:Q
3
0
2
:Q
1
0
2
:Q
3
0
3
:Q
1
0
3
:Q
3
0
4
:Q
1
0
4
:Q
3
Manufacturing value added
Foreign demand (right scale)
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
9
9
:Q
1
9
9
:Q
2
9
9
:Q
3
9
9
:Q
4
0
0
:Q
1
0
0
:Q
2
0
0
:Q
3
0
0
:Q
4
0
1
:Q
1
0
1
:Q
2
0
1
:Q
3
0
1
:Q
4
0
2
:Q
1
0
2
:Q
2
0
2
:Q
3
P
er
ce
nt
Trade and tourism Transport, storage and communications
Financial services
30 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
In 2002, private sector wage inflation only fell slowly despitethe progress in disinflation. Nevertheless, the fact that the
latest (November) data on wage inflation shows a remarkable
slowdown may indicate that more rapid adjustment to the lower
inflation environment has finally commenced. Taking this into
account, the rate of wage inflation in the private sector was
estimated at approximately 12.9% in 2002.15
According to the Bank’s expectations, in 2003 companies
will be forced to adopt more prudent wage policies against
the background of labour cost increases far in excess of pro-
ductivity growth over the past two years and the ongoing
disinflation process, as well as shrinking export profits and
weaker business activity. This could be reinforced as the long-
term contractionary effect on economic activity of the real
appreciation of the forint manifests itself. If the rise in unem-
ployment first seen late last year proves to be a lasting trend,
as assumed by the Bank, it may also hold wage growth in
check.
The wage agreement reached by the National Interest Rec-
onciliation Council last November is not likely to induce a
change in the practice of corporate level wage agreements of
3 Labour market and competitiveness
Table 3.1 Labour market data
Year-on-year change, per cent
MNB estimate Forecast
                       November Report         Current Report
2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
Manufacturing
Employment* -0.6 -1.8 -0.6 1.3 -2.0 -1.3 -0.2
Wage inflation* 14.4 12.3 5.7*** 5.1*** 11.9 6.9 4.9
ULC** 10.2 9.2 0.1 -1.4 7.9 1.1 0.3
Market services
Employment* 2.9 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.3
Wage inflation* 14.8 14.4 6.3*** 6.8*** 13.6 8.7 5.8
ULC** 11.8 9.8 2.5 3.2 9.3 4.6 1.9
Private sector
Employment* 1.1 -0.2 0.3 1.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.1
Wage inflation* 14.6 13.4 6.0*** 6.0*** 12.9 7.8 5.4
ULC** 10.8 9.3 1.3 1.1 8.4 2.9 1.2
* MNB estimates, see Manual to Hungarian economic statistics
** ULC denotes nominal increases in labour costs per unit of value added.
*** Assumptions.
15 In this analysis, ‘labour market’ solely denotes that of the private sector; while the
wage and employment-related developments within the public sector are discussed
in the section on fiscal policy.
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such magnitude as was assumed in the previous Report. There
is no evidence of such a development in the latest, January
results of a business survey conducted by the Social Research
Centre TÁRKI. Hence, the current projection, based on con-
sideration of the impact of demand and supply and expecta-
tions, is for a 7.8% rate of wage inflation in 2003, higher than
published earlier.
Private sector wage inflation in 2004, however, is projected
at 5.4%, a slightly more moderate rate than in November. This
is due to the long-term effects of real appreciation of the forint
as well as to the rise in unemployment.
The projection is for a minor depreciation of the unit labour
cost-based real exchange rate in 2003, and a flat level in 2004.
The Bank’s calculations suggest that competitiveness in terms
of prices continues to deteriorate, but that appreciation will
moderate as the inflation differential narrows.
3. 1 Labour usage
The previous Report suggested that the drop in the averagenumber of hours worked by manual workers in manufac-
turing, that is the decline in labour usage intensity, came to a
halt in the summer of 2002. Subsequent data have also rein-
forced this assumption; indeed, increases seen for the second
consecutive quarter give rise to the supposition that there has
been a turnaround in the trend, consistent with developments
in external demand and manufacturing production.16
Opposing trends emerged in manufacturing in the course of
the year: average hours worked in the machinery industry in-
creased from early 2002, in contrast to manufacture of textiles
and clothing and manufacture of food products, which experi-
enced a steady decline, with the other industries remaining flat.
As labour demand decreased more slowly in manufactur-
ing in the final months of the year, there was only a slight fall
in numbers employed and total hours worked.17  The rise in
employment in the market services sector was uninterrupted,
due to lively domestic economic activity, with an increase in
total hours worked.
For 2002, employment is expected to have been broadly
consistent with the previous projections in the area of both
manufacturing and market services, with a roughly 2% reduc-
tion in the numbers employed in manufacturing and an in-
crease of 1.4% in market services.
By contrast, in 2003 the decline in manufacturing employ-
ment will exceed the previously assumed rate. The downward
pressure on employment arising from the deterioration of com-
petitiveness, partly due to labour cost increases far in excess
of productivity growth over the past two years, appears to be
somewhat stronger than assumed previously. This is supported
by anecdotal evidence from end-2002, as well as the Bank’s
latest calculations. In 2003, the numbers employed in market
services is expected to increase at a weaker pace than in the
Chart 3.1 Average weekly hours worked by manual
workers in manufacturing*
Chart 3.2 Changes in the number of full-time
employees*
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Manufacturing Private services - right scale
* Data recalculated using statistical methods, for businesses
employing more than 5 people (source of original data: CSO). Actual
data are available up to November; December data are estimated
based on statistical methods.
* Source of original data: CSO. Actual data are available up to No-
vember; December data are estimated based on statistical methods.
16 Based on Central Statistical Office data up to November. The December figure
has been estimated using statistical methods.
17 Based on institutional labour statistics.
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previous year, as a consequence of the moderate increase in
consumption demand.
The central bank assumes that private sector employment
in 2004 will remain flat, as economic growth stagnates.
3. 2 Labour market reserves and
tightness
At end-2002, the economy witnessed an upsurge in labourmarket reserves. The proportion of unemployed people
edged up during second half of 2002.18  This may mark a turn-
ing point, following the flat levels and downward trend seen
previously. Registered unemployment also rose slightly in the
final months of last year.
In November 2002, the number of collective redundancies
increased significantly. According to the Bank’s assumptions,
this is partly due to the delayed impact of weaker business ac-
tivity in the world economy, especially in respect of larger, for-
eign-owned enterprises. However, the deterioration in com-
petitiveness due to labour costs increasing far in excess of pro-
ductivity growth and the appreciation of the real exchange rate
could also have contributed to the increasing number of
planned collective redundancies.19  The number of vacancies
fell slightly in the fourth quarter.20
This all points to a slackening in labour market tightness.
Even though at the aggregate level of the private sector no tight
capacities are assumed, certain regions and skills have been
affected by bottlenecks. Latest information suggests that this
tightness is also easing. The expected increase in labour mar-
ket reserves will likely also hold wage inflation in check.
3. 3 Wage inflation
In 2002, wage inflation moderated somewhat within the pri-vate sector as a result of opposing developments. Manufac-
turing wage inflation continued to edge down throughout the
year, while wage inflation in the sector of market services re-
mained flat.21  However, the latest (November) data suggests
faster adjustment to the lower inflation environment, especially
in manufacturing.22
The Bank estimates that wage inflation in 2002 both in manu-
facturing and private services was slightly down on the previ-
ous forecast (11.9% and 13.6%, respectively). The resulting av-
erage rate of wage inflation in the private sector is estimated
at 12.9% for 2002.
Chart 3.3 Rate of unemployment*
Chart 3.4 Number of collective redundancies*
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* Data reported for the given month and the number of people
affected (source of original data: Employment Office).
Chart 3.5 Number of registered vacancies*
* Data reported for the given quarter and the number of people
affected (source of original data: Employment Office). Actual data
are available up to November; December data are estimated based
on statistical methods.
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18 Based on the CSO Labour Force Survey.
19 It should be noted that assuming usually low values, this indicator is very sensi-
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20 Employment Office data up to November; December data are estimated based
on statistical methods.
21 Based on institutional labour statistics.
22 It is expedient to come to the conclusion only with knowledge of December data
because timing of bonus disbursements influences the growth rate of wages sig-
nificantly in last two months.
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The wage recommendation of the National Interest Rec-
onciliation Council for 2003 is not likely to alter the practice
of corporate level wage agreements to an extent that would
be consistent with the maintenance of the assumption used
in the previous Report. The agreement proposes a 4.5% rise
in private sector real wages. A recommendation in real terms
reflects uncertainty about and great deviations in disinflation
expectations, which is also confirmed by other information,
such as the business survey by TÁRKI. In 2003, as a conse-
quence of the changes in the personal income tax and social
contributions systems, the growth rate of net wages exceeds
that of gross wages at the aggregate level, but dispersion is
significant by income levels. However, net wages is a category
that employers find difficult to interpret, as it depends, to a
great extent, on individual employee circumstances (such as
the number of dependants, housing subsidies, investments,
etc.).
Opinions expressed since the agreement was reached indi-
cate that firms hold rather different views on the issue. Conse-
quently, the basis for the current projection has been switched
from the previous assumption to an assessment of the effects
of demand and supply forces and consideration of expecta-
tions and historical evidence.
In 2003, the Bank expects firms to adjust nominal wages
more rapidly to the environment of lower inflation. Wage in-
flation is forecast to be approximately 7.8% for the year as a
whole, owing to a sharp fall in actual quarter-on-quarter wage
increases. Considerably higher labour costs in the past two
years have caused corporate profitability to decline, which is
expected to induce enterprises to be more prudent in their
wage decisions in 2003. Against a background of sluggish eco-
nomic activity, subdued productivity improvement and wors-
ening profits earned from exports, as well as an over 5% rate
of disinflation, private sector nominal wage growth lessened
by merely 1.5 to 2 percentage points over the past two years.
Thus, real wages have increased far in excess of productivity
growth in the past two years.
The projection also takes account of the fact that the
disinflation achieved has not been accompanied by a corre-
sponding reduction in firms and households’ inflation expec-
tations. The latest survey conducted by TÁRKI in January 2003
indicates that companies continue to perceive inflation to be
4 percentage points higher than the actual rate.23  In addition,
while according to the results of the survey, inflation and wage
growth expectations followed a steady downward trend in
2002, this seems to have come to a halt in January 2003. Hence,
the latest survey results fail to reflect any decline in wage in-
crease intentions since the November Report.
On the other hand, wage increases may be held in check by
the lower level of labour market tightness and the potential
elimination of labour market bottlenecks previously experi-
enced in certain regions and skills. Furthermore, adjustment
by the labour market to the appreciated nominal exchange rate
as well as some delayed effects of the world economic
23 While in a period of disinflation, economic agents’ perceptions and expectations
of inflation normally exceed the actual rate, the present difference appears to be
excessively large.
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slowdown in 2001–2002 may cause further rises in unemploy-
ment, depending on labour market elasticities.
In 2004, private sector wages are forecast to increase at
around 5.4%, a somewhat slower pace than previously pro-
jected. The reasons behind lowering the forecast are the de-
layed negative effects of the strong real appreciation of 2001–
2002 on corporate profitability as well as the lower GDP growth
forecast for 2004.24
The Bank estimates that average labour costs increased 1.5
percentage points slower than wage inflation in 2002, due to a
reduction in employers’ social security contributions payable
on the gross wage bill.25  In 2003, itemised health care contri-
butions, part of labour costs in addition to gross wages, are
assumed to be lowered.26  This will cause average labour costs
to grow roughly 0.6 percentage points slower than wage infla-
tion. In the Bank’s projection, no reduction in taxes and con-
tributions is assumed for 2004.
3. 4 Productivity and unit
labour costs
Due to a slow but steady upturn in external demand, 2002Q3 witnessed a pick-up in domestic industrial activity.27
Manufacturing output increased relative to the previous quar-
ter, leading to better productivity as a result of a reduction in
numbers employed. The level of productivity has been increas-
ing ever since late 2001, which, due to the procyclical nature of
productivity, indicates that manufacturing has come out of the
trough of recession. As the performance of the service sector
is governed by the dual forces of domestic and external de-
mand, productivity within this sector improved at a relatively
balanced pace. Productivity in 2002 as a whole is estimated to
have grown by 2.2% in manufacturing and 2.6% in the service
sector.
In 2003, manufacturing activity is expected to increase, lead-
ing to a 5% upturn in productivity. By contrast, productivity
will increase less strongly (at around 4%) in 2004, when the
decline in the numbers employed is likely to end. Productivity
in the market services sector is likely to grow at a more even
pace of 3.5%, due to opposing developments in the compo-
nents of demand affecting the sector, with a pick-up in exter-
nal demand and a slowdown in the growth of consumer de-
mand.
Chart 3.7 Productivity and average nominal labour
costs in manufacturing
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
Chart 3.6 Wage inflation forecast
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates*
24 Although the changes to the personal income tax system in 2004 that have al-
ready been adopted by Parliament will lower the personal income tax burden,
changes to the social insurance contribution, which weigh on wages at closely the
same level, are unknown at present. Therefore, the forecast takes no account of the
differences between growth rate of gross and net wages.
25 In addition to gross wages, labour costs comprise other costs incurred by em-
ployers in connection with the employment of staff, including contributions and
taxes payable on wages, as well as other benefits aside from earnings (such as ben-
efits in kind, social benefits, dining allowances, reimbursement of commuting ex-
penses, support to further training programmes, etc.).
26 As of 1 January 2003, the amount of itemised health care contribution payable by
employees was reduced from HUF 4,500 to HUF 3,450.
27 As actual data on value added is available only up to 2002 Q3, the latest actual
data on productivity and unit labour costs also refer to this period.
* Source of original data: CSO. Actual data available up to Novem-
ber; December data are estimated based on statistical methods.
Chart 3.8 Productivity and average nominal labour
costs in market services
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
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Even though average nominal labour costs increased at a
slower pace during the third quarter in both manufacturing
and market services, their rate of growth still exceeded that of
productivity. Hence the sharp rise in unit labour costs in these
two sectors. Despite the recent steady slowdown in the growth
of unit labour costs, these costs have continued to increase at
a rate that caused firms’ competitiveness to worsen. In 2002,
unit labour costs were up 7.9% in manufacturing and 9.3% in
market services.
The downturn in profitability seen over the past two years
is expected to make firms carry out significant further adjust-
ments. According to the Bank’s expectations, the level of unit
labour costs in manufacturing will decline slightly in the latter
half of 2003. This process will be facilitated by a pick-up in
external activity and ensuing stronger productivity.
By contrast, stronger external business activity in 2004 may
exert renewed upward pressure on unit labour costs. The pro-
jection for unit labour costs in manufacturing is 1.1% in 2003
and 0.3% in 2004, compared with 4.6% and 1.9% in the service
sector in 2003 and 2004, respectively.
3. 5 Competitiveness
In order to measure the competitiveness of manufacturing inHungary, the Bank uses the ULC-based real exchange rate,
which is jointly determined by the nominal exchange rate as
well as relative changes in both domestic and foreign labour
costs. In addition to that, the price-based real exchange rate,
which measures the correction of differences between domes-
tic and foreign inflation with the nominal exchange rate, is also
employed to track changes in the competitiveness of the en-
tire national economy.
The deterioration of manufacturing competitiveness in Hun-
gary that began in 2000 slowed considerably in 2002 Q3. In
part, this can be ascribed to the fact that the growth rate of
domestic unit labour costs declined, and hence changed in
accordance with that of foreign competitors. Furthermore,
nominal appreciation stalled in the third quarter. As a result,
the price-based competitiveness of Hungarian economy dete-
riorated only slightly relative to its earlier level.
Although there are currently no actual data available for ULC
in 2002 Q4, it seems likely that nominal appreciation exceed-
ing 3% in this period impaired both ULC and price-based manu-
facturing competitiveness significantly.
The Bank’s ULC-based real projection is quite similar to what
was projected in the November Report as a result of the com-
bined effect of several factors. Although the nominal exchange
rate is assumed be slightly weaker than in the November Re-
port, domestic ULC is expected to increase more significantly
in 2003 than previously assumed. This effect is only partly off-
set by foreign ULC, which may well be higher than projected.
As a result, relative ULC will reach the level projected in No-
vember in 2003 and exceed it in 2004. All things considered,
the Bank expects the real exchange rate to be the same in 2003
and a bit more appreciated in 2004, respectively, compared
with the November projections.
Chart 3.9 Nominal unit labour costs
Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates
Chart 3.10 Unit labour cost based real effective
exchange rate in manufacturing*
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The Bank maintains its projection that in 2003 relative ULC
will decline primarily as a result of domestic corporate adjust-
ment, which in turn will result in low real depreciation amount-
ing to approximately 4.5%. By contrast, relative ULC will stop
decreasing in 2004. As a result, the real exchange rate is very
likely to remain the same.
Changes in the price-based real exchange rate in 2002 were
also determined by year-end real appreciation. The Bank
projects more moderate appreciation for the second half of
2003 and for 2004 as a result of lower domestic inflation.
Chart 3.11 Price based real effective exchange rate
indicators*
* An increase denotes a real depreciation.
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4 Monetary developments
4. 1 International economic
environment and risk perception
On 5 December 2002, the ECB reduced its key interest rateby half a percentage point to 2.75%. This interest rate cut,
which had been widely expected by the markets, had already
been incorporated into market yields. As regards the ECB’s pro-
spective interest rate moves, opinions appear to be more diverse.
The market as a whole has priced in a small – roughly 5 to 20
basis point – reduction for 2003, which is smaller than the small-
est percentage change the ECB applies in its interest rate moves.
The lingering global economic slowdown and increased politi-
cal tensions may fuel expectations of an interest rate reduction,
especially if the forecasts for lower inflation are justified. A drop
in inflation to a level consistent with price stability (below 2%)
within the euro area is primarily jeopardised by prospective de-
velopments in oil prices, in addition to insufficient restraint in
wage growth. The strengthening of the euro against the dollar is
expected to reduce inflationary pressure only slowly.
Even though global indicators of risk continue to be very high
relative to the average of the past few years, they have dropped
significantly in the past three months. This reflects international
investors’ increased appetite for risk and reduced uncertainty
of expectations, compared with the situation in November.
There has been exceptionally strong improvement in the risk
perception of EU accession countries. The Irish referendum
in October 2002, which would have postponed the date of entry
if the Irish had rejected the Treaty of Nice, had a favourable
outcome. The resolution passed at the 12–13 December Co-
penhagen summit on inviting the ten accession countries to
the European Union removed virtually all obstacles to joining
the Union in 2004, putting an end to the uncertainty about the
date of accession.
Thus, despite a worsening in Hungary’s macroeconomic bal-
ance, sovereign debt risk has not increased in recent months.
This is reflected in the narrowing spread on Hungarian govern-
ment bonds denominated in euro. In response to the favour-
able outlook for accession, on 12 November 2002 Moody’s an-
nounced an upgrade of the foreign exchange debt of eight ac-
cession countries. By contrast, Standard and Poor’s announced
their intention to downgrade government bonds denominated
in domestic currency for Hungary, Poland and the Czech Re-
public. However, this decision on forint-denominated sovereign
bonds, expected to have a potentially opposite effect on spreads
and taken in response to increases in Hungary’s forint deficit
and debt, has not had any repercussions yet.
Chart 4.1 ECB’s main refinancing rate and short-
term market rates
Chart 4.2 Global indicators of risk
Chart 4.3 Spread on Hungary’s euro-denominated
sovereign bonds
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4. 2 Interest rate and exchange rate
developments
Between August and November 2002, the exchange rate ofthe forint remained stable within a relatively narrow range.
However, early November witnessed the onset of marked ap-
preciation, and by January the exchange rate had come within
reach of the upper limit of the band. This appreciation proc-
ess was essentially governed by three factors. First, as noted
above, the period under review saw a clear reduction in risk
indicators. Second, the Irish referendum in October removed
a major hurdle to Hungary’s EU membership. This strength-
ened expectations about the country’s rapid accession to the
ERM-II exchange rate system and the single European currency,
narrowing the risk premium on forint investments, which in
turn caused the volume of convergence investments to in-
crease. Third, some news made public during the review pe-
riod implied increased risk to meeting the inflation targets set
in agreement with the Government, which explains why the
MNB did not completely pass on the fall in the risk premium
to its key rates.
The wage agreement reached in the National Interest Rec-
onciliation Council constituted a significant risk to the infla-
tion target for 2003 and 2004. Furthermore, it became obvious
that the 2003 Budget approved in December would not suffi-
ciently contract demand. Thus, the MNB felt that meeting the
targets would require a stronger exchange rate than that pre-
vailing in October. On the other hand, the proximity of the
strong edge of the intervention band required the Bank to cut
interest rates. Due to the appreciation of the forint, the Mon-
etary Council lowered the policy rates by 50 basis points on 18
November and another 50 basis points on 16 December. Since
the nominal exchange rate appreciation was strong, overall
monetary conditions were tightened.
These reductions led some market participants to realise that
the central bank was strongly committed to defending the
stronger edge of the band if needs be, even at the cost of ma-
jor interest rate changes. This realisation was incorporated into
interest expectations, as indicated by the fall in November in
yields on one-to-three-year government bonds. The one-year
reference yield fell from nearly 10% to below 7%, bringing the
one-year ex-ante real interest rate to below 2% currently (cal-
culated as a consensus of analysts surveyed by Reuters).
At the same time, the fact that the MNB allowed the exchange
rate to approach the strong edge of the band was interpreted
by another group of market participants to mean that the Bank
may need to shift the band in the near future in order to meet
the inflation targets. This opinion was held even though chang-
ing the central parity was a joint responsibility of the Govern-
ment and the central bank, and they had given no hint of such
intention.
These mistaken views were the precursor to the speculative
attack on January 16. Following initial exchange market inter-
vention, the Bank responded to the attack by making a drastic
cut of 200 basis points in the rate on the two-week deposit
facility, the Bank’s main policy instrument, lowering it to 6.5%
in the span of two days, in defence of the exchange rate band.
The effective interest rate was lowered even more sharply, by
Chart 4.4 One-year real interest rates
Chart 4.5 Exchange rate of the forint
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Chart 4.6 Key central bank interest rates and short-
term market rates
Chart 4.7 Three-month interest rate differential
vis-a`-vis the euro area
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500 basis points, as quantity limits were introduced on the two-
week deposits and the overnight interest rate corridor was
widened from ±1% to ±3%.
This drastic rate cut enabled the Bank to stop the specula-
tive attack. As a result, the exchange rate temporarily weakened,
eventually stabilising around HUF/EUR 245.
The speculative attack of January 2003 and its background
An attack was mounted on 15 January 2003 against the strong edge of the forint’s official intervention band.
Speculators believed that, with the forint appreciating, they would be able to force a shift in the band and close
positions at a favourable rate. The MNB purchased a considerable amount of euros at the strong edge on 15
and 16 January in order to prevent the further appreciation of the market rate.
In order to mitigate the band shift expectations that fuelled the speculative attack, the Monetary Council
expressed its commitment to defending the intervention band by making major interest rate cuts. On the first
day of the attack, on 15 January 2003, the interest rate on the 2-week deposit, the Bank’s main policy instru-
ment, was lowered by 100 basis points. As the Bank had to sell a large amount of forints at the edge of the band
on the following day as well, the Monetary Council decided to make another 100-basis-point cut. Accordingly,
the interest rate on the 2-week deposit dropped to 6.5%. Simultaneously, it imposed quantity limits on its main
policy instrument and widened the overnight interest rate corridor from ±1% to ±3%. As a result of such
measures, it is the overnight deposit rate (i.e. 3.5%) that has become the de facto key policy rate for the market.
* * *
The antecedents of the speculative onslaught date back to October and November 2002, when the forint was
under pressure to appreciate for two reasons. One was that, owing to improving EU accession perspectives,
the risk perception of forint investments had improved. As a result, demand for Hungarian government secu-
rities among foreign investors increased in November.
The other was growing inflation risks. The factors which monetary policy is unable to influence directly,
but which affect inflation significantly were rather unfavourable in the second half of 2002. In particular, the
high fiscal deficit and wage dynamics continuously in excess of productivity growth posed serious risks. It
follows from the logic of the inflation targeting system that under such circumstances market participants not
so much increase their inflation expectations, as they anticipate tightening monetary conditions.
One of the characteristics of the Hungarian economy is that the exchange rate of the forint is the very
instrument by means of which monetary policy can influence price movements efficiently. The direct impact
of short interest rates is slight and confined to shaping the exchange rate. Accordingly, in line with the logic of
inflation targeting, the market expected the mitigation of the unfavourable effects of external factors through
a higher rate of exchange. In reality, this meant that the level of HUF/EUR 240–250 still deemed as consistent
with the inflation targets in mid-2002 became too weak under the new circumstances.
Exchange rate expectations and the exchange rate had shifted close to the strong edge of the band. It be-
came plausible to think that, as monetary policy’s room for manoeuvre was considerably restricted, it would
be in the interest of monetary policy to revalue the central parity. Though the MNB emphasised that it was
willing to subordinate its interest rate policy to the protection of the edge of the band, the Reuters survey of
professional forecasters reveals that while the consensus exchange rate expectations remained within the
band, a minority of analysts definitely anticipated an early change in the exchange rate system as well as forint
appreciation exceeding the strong edge of the band.
The fact that it was probably not clear for all market participants who exactly had the authorisation to
change the exchange rate system, and the intervention band in particular, may have played a key role in the
attack. The investors who participated in the attack failed to consider the fact that, pursuant to the relevant
provisions of the Act on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the government in power and the MNB jointly decide on
any change related to the exchange rate system. Investors exclusively focused on the contradiction that they
had sensed between inflation targeting and the existence of the exchange rate band despite the fact that in
November, when the forint appreciated, both the Government and the MNB stood up firmly for the current
exchange rate band.
An indication of the amount of the expected foreign exchange gains was the willingness of speculators to
undertake the substantial risk posed by the insufficiently deep foreign exchange market. When trying to real-
ise profits, their demand for euro would have probably caused the exchange rate to weaken to such an extent
that would have even turned some of the gains into losses.
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4. 2. 1 Interest rate and exchange rate expectations
The latest Reuters survey gives an insight into analysts’ ex-
change rate and interest rate expectations. On the deadline
for the survey responses – Wednesday, 23 January – the rate
on the two-week deposit was already reduced to 6.5% and the
exchange rate was HUF 247–249 per euro. The analysts inter-
viewed did not expect the exchange rate to return quickly to
the edge of the band. The consensus forecast was HUF 243.5
at end-February and HUF 239 per euro in December 2003.
The majority of analysts expect the interest rate on the two-
week deposits to be 7% as early as end-February. However, ex-
pectations derived from the yield curve predict interest rates to
be slightly lower in late February. At the same time, both the
Reuters survey and the yield curve indicate that the market ex-
pects the base rate to be approximately 6.8% at end-2003. Ana-
lysts do not expect a considerable reduction in interest rates
sooner than 2004. Their prediction for 2004 is that rates will be
down to 5.75% by the year-end. This reduction is equal to the
expected change in inflation for the corresponding period.
4. 3 Capital flows
The previous quarter saw strong capital inflows from abroad.Increased certainty about EU accession and its date pro-
vided long-term Hungarian government securities with an ad-
ditional allure for international portfolio investors, expecting
further interest rate convergence. Accordingly, non-residents’
holdings of government securities continued to rise at a fast
pace over the past quarter, while their average maturity re-
mained broadly unchanged. Trading by non-residents lost
some of its momentum during the holiday season in Decem-
ber, consistent with the overall slowdown in capital market
activity, only to surge again in early January.
The upsurge in demand early in the year is a well-known
phenomenon in the domestic market, as it is typical at the start
of the year that international investors make efforts to realise
their investment strategy adopted for the new year. This involves
complementing their portfolios to match the strategic target
portfolio determined for the new year. This implies net bond
purchases. This year, the pick-up in government securities trad-
ing emerged in mid-January, accounting for 4.4% of non-resi-
dents’ total holdings. Nevertheless, the average remaining term
to maturity of 3.5 years indicates that the great majority of those
investing in government securities wish to benefit from the in-
terest rate convergence expected in the wake of the euro-area
accession and typically hold medium-term investments.
Examining the components of forint demand and supply,
demand for forint (capital inflows) was higher than supply
(capital outflows), despite the substantial current account defi-
cit. This was attributable mainly to large purchases of Hungar-
ian government securities, amounting to HUF 241 billion net
in Q3 and to HUF 199 billion in October–November. This coun-
terbalanced the effects of slower inflows of direct investment
capital and other, smaller financing items.
The increase in commercial banks’ on-balance sheet open
foreign currency position has been continuous and rapid since
the end of the summer. Banks attempted to offset the increase
Chart 4.8 Changes in the forint exchange rate
versus analysts’ exchange rate expectations
Chart 4.10 Non-residents’ holdings of government
securities and their average term to maturity
Chart 4.9 Central bank two-week deposit rate
versus interest rate expectations based on the yield
curve and the Reuters survey
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in their on-balance sheet open positions by using instruments
offering a hedge against exchange rate risk. Consequently, their
total open position remained low at around HUF 20–30 bil-
lion. In this way the banking sector accommodated to the capi-
tal inflows until the forint exchange rate reached the upper
edge of the intervention band. The exchange rate having
reached the upper edge, however, banks sold and converted
into forints their holdings of foreign currency in large quanti-
ties, as a result of which their on-balance sheet positions turned
short. But, with the adjustment of forward positions, their to-
tal open position changed only little, moving around the neu-
tral level or slightly below it (foreign currency short position),
following the speculative attack.
4. 4 Long-term yields and inflation
expectations
In the period between November 2002 and end-January 2003,government securities yields fell, mainly at the short end. The
12-month discount treasury bill yield plunged from 9.4% to 6.4%,
whereas the 10- and 15-year reference yields fell more modestly,
by 50–60 basis points. This fall in yields virtually occurred at
two distinct moments – the first large drop took place in mid-
November and the second in mid-January. The two episodes
affected yields and their maturity profile differently.
The fall in yields in November can be explained by expecta-
tions related to Hungary’s approaching accession to the EU
and its participation in the ERM-II. In the Bank’s judgement,
the increasing international demand for risky investments ex-
Table 4.1 Components of foreign exchange market demand and supply*
HUF billions
2001 2002
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Oct–Nov.
I. Current and capital accounts adjusted for foreign exchange balance
of consolidated general government (1+2 –3) –52 –124 79 –97 –133 –252 –158 –148
1. Current account –63 –195 71 –131 –137 –301 –165 –165
2. Capital account 15 39 23 16 13 15 6 8
3. Foreign exchange balance of consolidated general government 3 –32 14 –19 9 –34 –1 –9
II. FDI inflow (excluding privatisation revenue) 126 179 108 155 42 113 36 15
III. Forint demand arising form conversion of domestic foreign currency deposits –28 –15 –6 –111 58 –62 26 –48
1. Business sector –20 –21 2 –64 25 –70 13 –53
2. Households –8 6 –8 –47 34 8 13 5
IV. Net portfolio investments (1+2+3) 90 212 –134 85 214 –5 117 234
1. Government securities 90 196 –79 136 144 32 241 199
2. Equity securities 6 –10 8 –15 12 –30 –25 –27
3. Forint deposits –6 26 –62 –36 58 –7 –98 62
V. Corporate foreign currency  borrowing (1+2) –84 –128 –44 –62 –202 –44 –65 41
1. In Hungary –10 5 19 –12 45 55 69 49
2. Abroad –74 –134 –63 –50 –247 –99 –135 –8
VI. Forint demand of other credit  institutions 12 37 50 99 23 119 100 43
VII. Other 47 18 20 132 5 60 12 84
VIII. Net forint demand outside the banking sector (VIII = II + … + VII) 112 178 73 201 7 –70 68 221
IX. Purchases of foreign currency by central bank** 178 165 47 40 0 0 0 0
Change in banks’ on-balance sheet long foreign currency position (I–IX) –65 13 26 161 7 –70 68 221
* Positive values denote forint demand and negative values denote forint supply.
** From 2001 Q2, central bank purchases of foreign currency denote central bank purchases of foreign currency in equal daily amounts, instead of intervention.
Chart 4.11 Benchmark yields in the government
securities market
Chart 4.12 Change in one-year implied forward
rates* and forint-euro forward differentials in
November
*Zero-coupon yield curve fitting a la Svensson
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erted a much smaller influence on government securities
prices; and inflation expectations changed little.
The exchange rate risk perceived by foreign investors dimin-
ishes in the ERM-II considered as the entrance hall to Economic
and Monetary Union. Moreover, the imminence of accession even
implies a more predictable exchange rate than the previous pe-
riod. All this results in a fall in the required risk premium on forint-
denominated investments at the corresponding maturities.
Implied forward rates, calculated from government securities
yields, more or less reflect the market’s expectations of future
interest rates. Consequently, they are suitable for deriving a pic-
ture of developments in future required risk premia. The shift
in the forward curve occurred at the 0- to 3-year segment in Oc-
tober–end-November, consistent with the above discussion. The
extent of this change amounted to 100–200 basis points at some
sections of the curve. In addition to the fall in risk premium, the
market presumably priced in currency appreciation, maintain-
ing a slight, although positive, likelihood of a shift in the official
intervention band. The exchange rate expectations expressed
in Reuters’ December poll appear to reinforce this view.
The differentials between implied forint forward rates and euro
forward rates were virtually static or rose slightly beyond 3 years.
This suggests that the improvement in international risk percep-
tions (see Section 4.1) played a marginal role in movements in
yields. Past years’ experience show that increasing global appe-
tite for risks usually increases demand for forint-denominated
government securities virtually independently of their maturity,
so it mostly exerts its influence across the full length of the yield
curve. Although the implied forward rates of forint yields practi-
cally do not contain a premium over euro yields beyond 9–10
years, the improvement in global investor sentiment could have
reduced the current 1% premium on the 4 to 5-year horizon.
After the speculative attack in mid-January 2003 (see Box),
there was a slight increase in implied forward rates beyond
one year. However, the 20–40 basis point rise in one-year for-
ward rates is not seen as particularly high. Accordingly, one
cannot infer from information extracted from the yield curve
that inflation expectations have altered significantly in the past
one month. This is reinforced by the survey of professional
forecasters. According to the Reuters poll conducted after the
commencement of the speculative attack, inflation expected
at end-2003 only exceeded expectations for earlier months
within the margin of error (by 5.0%, in contrast with the aver-
age 4.8%–4.9% characterising the period since June 2002). This
is consistent with the appreciation of forint expected by ana-
lysts. Average expectations for December 2004, asked for the
first time, is 4.1%, which is inside the still tolerable ±1 per cent
range surrounding the inflation target.
Another reason for presuming that inflation expectations
have not risen significantly in recent months is the relative sta-
bility of the forward yield curve, both in terms of its level and
slope beyond 4 years. A potential deterioration in inflation
expectations would postpone the expected date of joining
EMU, and would also increase longer-term forward rates, as
right now early EMU-entry is priced into the yield curve. Even
after the exchange rate weakening which followed the attack,
the overwhelming majority of analysts participating in the
Reuters survey still expected Hungary to join EMU in 2007–
2008, reinforcing the Bank’s interpretation of the yield curve.
Chart 4.13 Change in one-year implied forward
rates* and forint-euro forward differentials in
January
*Zero-coupon yield curve fitting a la Svensson
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
years ahead
Pe
rc
en
t
Pe
rc
en
t
forint, 15.01.03.
forint-euro, 27.01.03.forint-euro, 15.01.03.
forint, 27.01.03.
Chart 4.14 Reuters’ survey of analysts’ inflation
expectations
Chart 4.15 Reuters’ survey of inflation
expectations in January
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5. 1 Macroeconomic effects
of the 2001–2004 fiscal policy –
model simulations
Adetailed analysis of the prospective macroeconomic ef-fects of fiscal policy in 2001 and 2002 was published in
the November 2001 Report. That analysis hinged on the rule-
based projection that the impact of the future decisions in fis-
cal policy was not projected. Hence, it was exclusively the con-
ditions disclosed which formed the basis for the projections.
It follows, therefore, that the budgetary paths projected for
2001 and 2002 in November 2001 differed significantly from
the preliminary and actual figures also reflecting the impact
of later decisions. Retaining and fine-tuning the analytical
framework described in the analysis in November and taking
into account the processes occurring in 2001 and 2002 as well
as those projected for 2003 on the basis of the Budget approved
for 2003, this analysis seeks to provide an overall view of the
effects of the structural shifts in the successive Budgets between
2001 and 2003.
However, the macroeconomic effects that also spill over to
2004 can only be assessed in a satisfactory manner, if the analy-
sis of fiscal policy also applies to 2004. Similar to the Bank’s
previous analysis, this study also compares the Budgets in each
of the years 2001–2004 with a baseline fiscal path which, com-
pared to the Budget for 2000, assumed to be sustainable in
terms of both the level of deficit and long-term structure, also
includes predetermined components and the impacts of ef-
fect mechanisms. Accordingly, the results can be interpreted
in the context of such a scenario.
Furthermore, the fact that model behaviour has changed
somewhat, owing to the continuous upgrading of the model-
ling tools at the Bank’s disposal, also reinforced the intention
to rerun the simulations.28
5 Special topics
28 Based on the foregoing, the previous analysis was updated in the following fash-
ion. As a first step, simulations were carried out with the current version of the
NIGEM model using the budgetary path projected in November 2001. As the sec-
ond step, further simulations based on actual fiscal figures for 2001 and 2002 and
projected ones for 2003-2004 were run so that the macroeconomic effects of the
budgetary developments of the recent years could be identified. This made it pos-
sible to express the additional effects of fiscal decisions relative to earlier projec-
tions in terms of figures as well. As a result, it is not the figures published in the
November 2001 Report with which the results yielded by the current simulations
on the Budgets of 2001-2004 were compared, but the current setting of the model
computed on the basis of the assumptions disclosed in the Report of November
2001.
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Shifts in the budgetary path
When evaluating the impacts of fiscal policy on the economy,
it is important that not only the size but also the composition
of fiscal demand effect should be taken into account. A given
size of fiscal tightening or expansion, with different composi-
tions, may produce markedly different effects on both infla-
tion and growth. The actual path of the Budget has changed
fundamentally since the simulation in November 2001. The
changes can be observed in the table above.
In the case of the baseline path, the fact that both prelimi-
nary and actual data had become available for 2001 and 2002
on the determinants and automatic mechanisms (e.g. Swiss
indexing and cuts in customs tariffs) of fiscal policy repre-
sented a shift compared to the earlier simulation. Continued
pension reform was new information in respect of 2003. The
resultant losses in revenue also had to be corrected for, since
the reform is unlikely to influence demand.
If preliminary figures on 2001 and 2002 are compared with
the composition projected in 2001, it can be concluded that
the outturns of the two years were less characteristic than ex-
pected. An increase in capital expenditure was projected for
2001, whereas 2002 was more likely to experience an increase
in wages and household transfers. Although, owing to fiscal
developments, capital expenditure failed to pick up speed at
the expected rate in 2001, it increased in 2002 at a rate much
higher than projected. By contrast, a portion of the increase in
wages and household transfers projected for 2002 was brought
forward to 2001. Another difference was that overall demand
impulse was much larger in 2002 than was projected in No-
vember 2001. Its composition led to an even higher rise in
wages and transfers and to increasing rather than decreasing
spending on goods and services.
If structural analysis is expanded to include 2003, it can be
stated that the individual items of revenue (as a percentage of
GDP) are likely to correspond to what could be hypothesised
in the baseline path, allowing for the effects of fiscal determ-
inations. Thus, discounting the effects of these determinations,
each item of revenue is likely to correspond to its year 2000
Table 5.1 Structure of changes in the primary general government balance
As a percentage of GDP
baseline scenario Nov. 2001 fiscal scenario New fiscal scenario
2001–2003 2001 2002 2001 2002 2003 2001-2003 2004
Wages and transfers –0.1* 0.2 0.8 0.6 1.8 0.6 2.9 –0.1
Capital expenditure 0.0 1.3 –0.1 0.3 2.0 –1.3 1.0 –1.0
Spending on goods and services. Other. 0.0 0.6 –0.4 1.0 0.7 –0.1 1.5 –0.8
Total expenditure –0.1 2.2 0.3 1.9 4.5 –0.9 5.3 –1.9
Personal income tax 0.1** 0.3 –0.1 0.4 0.4 –0.7** 0.1 0.0
Corporate tax (net) 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.5 0.6 0.0 0.1
Other taxes –0.3*** –0.8 –0.1 –0.6 0.2 0.1 –0.3 0.2
Total revenue –0.2 –0.5 –0.2 –0.3 0.1 0.0 –0.2 0.3
Balance (excluding the effects of the debt repayment by Russia
and of the pension reform) –0.1 –2.7 –0.5 –2.1 –4.3 0.9 –5.5 2.2
Impact of the repayment of debts owed by Russia 0.0 –0.2 0.0 –0.2 0.0 0.0 –0.2 0.0
Changes in primary balance, total**** –0.1 –2.5 –0.5 –1.8 –4.3 0.9 –5.3 2.2
* Automatically saved on pensions on the basis of the Swiss indexing formula.
** Continued pension reform entails losses in revenue, which, however, do not affect demand and hence are back-corrected in shifts.
*** Losses in duties automatically posted owing to gradually decreasing customs tariffs.
**** In the interest of comparability it was calculated excluding the effect of the methodological change warranted by corporate consolidation. As a result, it is different from what is
stated in Sub-section 2.1.2.
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counterpart, meaning that revenue is likely to return to the ini-
tial level (as a percentage of GDP) in 2003. On the expendi-
ture side, in contrast, each item will exceed its 2000 base pe-
riod counterpart considerably, as a percentage of GDP.
As far as the fiscal demand effect of 2004 was concerned,
the analysis hypothesises that, in order to reach the fiscal posi-
tion targeted in the PEP, the 2.2-per cent fiscal tightening pro-
jected for 2004 would materialise in a structure in which the
expenditure and revenue structure of the baseline path, i.e.
the 2000 Budget which is deemed as neutral, would be restored,
wherever possible.29
Shifts due to the upgrading of the model
Model simulations were performed with the Hungarian block
of the NIGEM model.3 0 Compared with the calculations pub-
lished in the November 2001 Report, two main changes have
been made to the NIGEM model on the basis of information
available since then. One was that the sensitivity of imports to
short-term fluctuations in the business cycle was increased
somewhat. As a result, a given demand shock will, ceteris pari-
bus, take less time to manifest itself in the model. At the same
time, the long-term effects will remain the same. The other
pertains to a longer-term relationship. Calculations were made
on the assumption that government fixed investment did not
affect long-term economic growth potential.3 1
Macroeconomic effects of the 2001–2003 fiscal policy
Data reveal that the fiscal expansion between 2001 and 2003
increased GDP growth by 0.5% in 2001 compared with the 0.9%
estimated on the basis of earlier data. A moderate rate of fiscal
expansion in 2001, relative to what had been expected, ac-
counted for this difference. This also entailed a smaller-than-
expected current account deficit and a slightly lower rate of
inflation.
However, owing to the expansiveness of the 2002 fiscal
policy, the model projected a considerably more forceful im-
pact on GDP growth (1.4% compared with an earlier estimate
of 0.1%) and a larger effect on inflation and the current ac-
29 We deviated from this rule in the case of wages and transfers, where, in line with
the assumptions presented in Section 2 of this Report, more modest tightening was
taken as a basis. The other deviation relates to government consumption, where a
strict application of the rule would have implied extremely strong tightening. Also,
despite the tax allowances introduced in 2003, net income taxes may increase rela-
tive to their level in 2000, as corporate subsidies have reverted to their 2000 level.
The increase in other revenues may be attributed to the effects of EU transfers.
30 For a detailed description of the Hungarian block, see ‘Hungary in the NIGEM
model’ by Zoltán M. Jakab and Mihály András Kovács, MNB Working Papers, 3/2002
31 As pointed out in the Report in November 2001, tackling government fixed invest-
ment in macroeconomic models is rather problematic. International research is di-
vided on the long-term efficiency of such investment. To summarise, although gov-
ernment fixed investment does contribute to increased potential economic output
to a certain extent, its efficiency is considerably lower than that of private fixed
investment. Accordingly, its long-term effect is rather dubious. As NIGEM has not
been developed to address this issue, it is unable to do so in an appropriately de-
tailed manner. There are two cases that the model can handle. By default, like pri-
vate fixed investment, government projects also increase potential economic out-
put. However, with this effect cancelled out, the model can be set in such a manner
that government capital expenditure should not alter economic growth potential.
The Bank opted for the latter solution in the analysis, since in the Bank’s view, the
bulk of the items classified as government fixed investment, are corporate capital
transfers, whose efficiency is all the more dubious as they cover historical or pro-
spective debts rather than fixed investment activities in the classical sense. All things
considered, however, this projection did not mean significant restrictions during
the few years’ run of the model.
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count than that simulated for 2002 based on previous assump-
tions. As the considerable expansion relative to 2000 is unlikely
to reverse significantly in 2003 and the spillover effect of the
previous years is also likely to manifest itself, the deviation of
inflation will grow substantially in 2003 and 2004. Moreover,
external imbalance will continue to increase in both years.
The updated analysis substantiates earlier calculations,
namely that fiscal expansion in Hungary impairs external bal-
ance in particular. At the same time, its effect on inflation is
likely to be relatively moderate. However, due to overall ex-
pansion in 2001–2003 and its gradual build-up in the entire
economy, the inflationary effect in 2003–2004 might be sub-
stantial, exceeding one percentage point.
The table below compares the results of the simulation with
the actual macroeconomic variables. The data included un-
equivocally indicate that, given a neutral fiscal policy, growth in
2002 was rather lacklustre and annual inflation stood under 5%.
At the same time, however, the fact that the current account defi-
cit rose above 5% of GDP was – in addition to the drop in house-
holds savings – caused by the 2001–2002 fiscal expansion.
5. 2 What role is monetary policy
likely to have played in disinflation?
Following widening of the intervention band of the exchangerate in May 2001, CPI decreased by a monthly average of
6.0 per cent and a quarterly average of 5.7 per cent by the year-
end 2002. The following considers to what extent monetary
policy has contributed to disinflation over the past one and a
half years.
In sum, calculations on quarterly data reveal that 2.3–4.1
percentage points (i.e. approximately 40%–70%) of the 5.7-
percentage-point disinflation at the year-end 2002 can be at-
tributed to the impact of monetary policy. Naturally, this is only
the initial and relatively direct impact of monetary policy. With
the passage of time, as price and wage expectations subside,
Table 5.2 Major macroeconomic effects of the 2001–2004 Budgets
Impacts expressed as percentage points difference of annual growth rates compared to the baseline. In parentheses are the results calculated on the basis of the fiscal assumptions
published in the November 2001 Report
Household consumption Government consumption
Fixed investment Exports Imports
expenditure expenditure
2001 0.2 (0.1) 5.3 (6.5) 1.0 (3.4) 0.0 (0.0) 0.8 (1.6)
2002 1.4 (0.7) 3.1 (0.2) 6.0 (3.4) –0.1 (0.1) 2.4 (0.2)
2003 3.1 (1.1) –1.2 (0.0) 2.1 (0.2) –0.4 (0.2) 0.5 (0.5)
2004 2.7 (–0.9) –7.2 (0.0) –5.1 (0.2) –0.7 (–0.3) 0.0 (–0.6)
Primary general Change in primary general
GDP Inflation1 Current account2
government balance2 government balance3
2001 0.5 (0.9) 0.1 (0.2) –0.7 (–1.3) –1.8 (–2.5) –1.8 (–2.5)
2002 1.4 (0.1) 0.7 (0.5) –2.0 (–1.2) –6.1 (–3.0) –4.3 (–0.5)
2003 0.0 (0.1) 1.3 (0.5) –2.2 (–1.5) –5.2 (–1.8) 0.9 (1.2)
2004 –0.4 (–0.5) 1.1 (0.5) –2.3 (–1.2) –3.0 (–0.9) 2.2 (0.9)
1 Annual average
2 Deviation from the level of the baseline as a percentage of GDP.
3 Change as a percentage of GDP.
Table 5.3 Actual data and the effects of fiscal policy*
2001 3.7 / 3.2 9.2 / 9.1 –2.2 / –1.5 –0.6 / 1.2
2002 3.3 / 1.9 5.3 / 4.6 –5.6 / –3.6 –4.9 / 1.2
* In per cent. Actual values are those before the “/” sign, simulated values
(with the baseline fiscal scenario) are those after.
** Annual average.
*** as a percentage of GDP
With actual /
baseline fiscal
scenario
Growth in
GDP
Inflation**
Current account
of the balance of
payments***
SNA-based primary
balance of general
government***
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the inflation targeting system will be able to contribute to
disinflation to an increasingly greater degree.
The previous chapter (5.1.) dealt with the macroeconomic
effects of fiscal policy. The NIGEM simulations revealed that
had fiscal policy been on the same track as in 2000, annual av-
erage inflation of 5.3% would have been lower by 0.7 percent-
age points in 2002. That is to say, fiscal policy increased infla-
tion significantly last year. Monetary policy had to counteract
this effect in order achieve the jointly agreed inflation target for
2002. In what follows the Bank estimates to what extent mon-
etary policy alone has contributed to disinflation since mid-2001.
In addition to the headline index, the CSO’s core inflation
index has also decreased considerably, falling by approximately
5.0 percentage points. Since core inflation does not include
highly volatile items (e.g. unprocessed food, administered
prices and energy), which are exogenous from the standpoint
of monetary policy, this alone suggests that disinflation has
been significant even within the categories that monetary
policy considers relevant. All this happened despite the fact
that fiscal policy was expansive in both 2001 and 2002, and the
economy was also exposed to severe demand and expendi-
ture shocks.
In small open economies, monetary policy can influence
inflation primarily through exchange rates. However, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between direct short-term and indirect
long-term effects within the scope of the influences that ex-
change rates can exert.
Reflected typically in the declining price index of tradables,
petrol and certain types of food, direct short-term effects mani-
fest themselves mainly through imports becoming increasingly
cheaper owing to exchange rate appreciation. This is a rela-
tively short process which, as a rule, is dominant on a 12 to 18-
month horizon following exchange rate appreciation.
Indirect long-term effects manifest themselves predomi-
nantly in the labour and product markets. On the one hand,
exchange rate appreciation pushes down corporate labour
demand and hence nominal wages, which in turn reduces in-
flation both on the cost side and through a drop in aggregate
demand. On the other hand, the price margin also shrinks
owing to reduced output caused by real appreciation and
higher real wages. As real economic adjustment is the most
important factor in these processes, indirect long-term effects
will take two to three years to make themselves felt.
At the same time, however, the most important component
of permanent long-term disinflation is nominal wage adjust-
ment. The more rapidly nominal wages can adjust themselves
to a lower rate of inf lation, the lower the real costs of
disinflation and hence the weaker the aforementioned indi-
rect impacts exerted through reduced output.
It can be concluded therefore that the effects of monetary
policy can be expressed in terms of figures only if interaction
between nominal and real processes is taken into account.
However, only a model adopting a general equilibrium frame-
work can handle this issue of simultaneity. The MNB currently
employs the NIGEM model for conducting analysis of this
kind.3 2
32 See Section 5.1. for another application and references.
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Using this model, simulations have been performed with
the goal of examining changes in prices supposing that, fol-
lowing widening of the band, the exchange rate between 2001
Q2 and 2002 Q4 remained at a fixed level, i.e. HUF/EUR 265.7,
which was the average rate in 2001 Q1. These simulations re-
vealed that with a lower rate of exchange, CPI would have been
2.3 percentage points higher in 2002 Q4. Consequently, over
40% of the actual 5.7 percentage point decline in inflation must
have been induced by monetary policy.
Naturally, no model can perfectly simulate the workings of
an economy. Therefore, when NIGEM results are evaluated, a
few additional factors that could not be included in the
simulations should be taken into consideration.
One such important factor is that not only the exchange rate
appreciated, but the pricing behaviour of market participants
also changed following band widening. In other words, the
change to the monetary regime does not simply mean a
stronger exchange rate, but also means a different economic
environment, in which the effects of exchange rate apprecia-
tion on disinflation take a long time to manifest themselves.
Another factor is that, for reasons of caution, a fixed exchange
rate was employed in the simulation despite the fact that the
exchange rate would have declined steadily had the crawling
peg devaluation system been still operational. These factors
suggest that the 40% that the NIGEM model has established as
the share of monetary policy in disinflation is in reality to be
interpreted as a low estimate.
A high estimate of the role of monetary policy can be made
if the major factors of disinflation that are definitely not linked
with changes in monetary policy are taken stock of. Such fac-
tors include Brent oil prices in USD, the USD/EUR exchange
rate, changes in the price of unprocessed foods in euro and
regulatory measures. It must be noted that the petrol price in-
dex, which has been an inflationary factor since October 2002,
was excluded from this approach.
Adding all these items, the result shows that 1.6 percentage
points, or some 30% of the overall 5.7 percentage points
disinflation was due to such developments without a doubt.
That is, the rest, or 4.1 percentage points (some 70%) of the
total amount of disinflation may or may not have been linked
to monetary policy.
Recently, there has been debate about the contribution of some
‘postponed’ regulated price increases in 2001–2002 (e.g. house-
hold gas price increases, TV fees, etc.). Had these measures been
taken, overall disinflation would have been smaller. Note, how-
ever, that the calculations above imply that the contribution of
monetary policy to disinflation would not have been altered at
all. It follows technically that in such case the relative contribu-
tion of monetary policy to disinflation would have been larger.
5. 3 What do detailed Czech and
Polish inflation data show?
With the increase in the width of the intervention bandand the introduction of the inflation targeting system in
2001, the framework of Hungarian monetary policy was altered
significantly. As an effect, the forint appreciated strongly. Si-
Chart 5.1 Czech and Polish inflation
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multaneously with this, inflation dropped to levels around 5%.
It may be instructive to examine the developments in prices of
goods and services relevant for monetary policy in the period
of the successfully implemented disinflation programmes in
the Czech Republic and Poland, two other convergence coun-
tries in the Central and Eastern European region.33 It should
be noted that our analysis focuses on stylised facts based on
disaggregated consumer price data.
Currently, both the Czech Republic and Poland float their
respective currencies and also follow inflation targeting re-
gimes.34  Increasing the width of the intervention bands and
subsequently abandoning them opened the door for sustained
appreciation of these countries’ national currencies, fuelled
by the two countries’ convergence position. Exchange rate ap-
preciation was directly allowed by a drop in import prices, then
by a moderation in output activity, due to the influence ex-
erted on competitiveness. In connection with this, the Czech
and Polish experiences provide the following lessons:35
• Currency appreciation had the strongest influence on the
prices of tradables, and on those of durables in particular.
The latter not only experienced a decline in the rate of in-
crease, but their price levels steadily fell as well.
• Disinflation in tradables prices occurring in the periods of
currency appreciation was followed by a reduction in the
rates of increase of market services prices.
• Flexible wage adjustment was observed as well, in addition
to lasting disinflation.
Variations in the exchange rate had the most direct and im-
mediate impact on tradables prices. In Poland, for example,
the massive drop in the rate of price increases in this category
of goods started after the exchange rate was allowed to float
freely from April 2000. From that point on, disinflation became
increasingly intense in the categories of both durables and non-
durables. Note that although there were episodes of price falls
being observed, durables or overall tradables inflation has
never been below zero, that is, never reached deflation for
longer periods of time.
In the Czech Republic, the appreciation of the exchange rate
quickly fed through to tradables prices from early 1998, after
introduction of the inflation targeting system. Simultaneously
with the trend appreciation of the exchange rate, the prices of
durable goods fell. In addition, the price level of the entire
tradables aggregate fell or stagnated for a protracted period,
in contrast with Poland.
Both in Poland and in the Czech Republic, the moderation in
tradables price inflation and the decline in prices was followed
by a drop in the rate at which market services prices increased.
Chart 5.2 Exchange rate of the Czech koruna and
Polish zloty vis-a`-vis the euro (DEM)
Chart 5.3 Polish tradables inflation and the zloty
exchange rate
Trend of annualised monthly rates in the case of tradables
Chart 5.4 Czech tradables inflation and the koruna
exchange rate
Trend of annualised monthly rates in the case of tradables
Chart 5.5 Polish tradables and market services
inflation
(For tradables and market services, trend of annualised month-on-
month growth rates)
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33 Based on detailed CPI data received as a courtesy of the Czech and the Polish Na-
tional Banks. The data was grouped according to the CPI classification employed at
the MNB, so that the Czech and Polish groups are comparable to those in this Report.
34 The Czech Republic widened the Koruna’s fluctuation band from ±0.5% to ±7.5%
in 1996. Then, abandoning the band, it switched to managed floating in 1997. The
inflation targeting system has been in operation since 1 January 1998. Poland in-
creased the width of the fluctuation band in several steps – to ±12.5%- on 28 Octo-
ber 1998. On 12 April 2000, a year after the band was widened to ±15%, the country
switched to free floating of the zloty. The inflation targeting system was introduced
in October 1998.
35 In his paper ‘Exchange rate pass-through and the real exchange rate in EU candi-
dates’ Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers 10/01, Zsolt Darvas examined the
issue from another perspective, using different methods, for example, aggregated
data and econometric estimates.
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Another lesson to learn is that, in addition to lasting disin-
flation, wage adjustment was also observable, simultaneously
with the easing of inflation expectations.
In addition to the two countries’ similar experiences, a
number of differences were also observable. Exchange rate
pass-through to Czech tradables prices was more intensive. This
difference may be explained by several factors. First, the higher
the volatility of the exchange rate, the weaker the pass-through
effect can be. Second, the exchange rate regime itself may also
be a factor influencing movements in prices. In Poland, the
exchange rate appreciated strongly and repeatedly, occasion-
ally by more than 10%, within the confines of the ±15% wide
fluctuation band, following the introduction of the inflation
targeting system. In spite of this, a massive decline in the rate
of tradables price inflation only started after the exchange rate
was allowed to fluctuate freely from April 2000. In principle,
exchange rate volatility may be lower within the band than in
the case of a free float, which tends to amplify the pass-through
effect. However, introducing the free float in a convergence
economy may open room for a lasting exchange rate appre-
ciation.
Another difference between the two countries’ experiences
with disinflation is that, at the beginning of the sustained peri-
ods of currency appreciation, the gap between the rates of in-
creases of tradables and services prices, i.e. the inflation dif-
ferential, increased in the Czech Republic, while it stagnated
in Poland. This was in connection with the MNB’s observation
that the exchange rate pass-through was more modest in Po-
land.
Poland experienced that the price effect of short periods of
depreciation (at mid-2001 and in the second half of 2002), oc-
casionally observable during longer-term exchange rate appre-
ciation, was not stronger than that of appreciation. This may
serve as an interesting lesson.
Undoubtedly, the overall faster and more persistent disin-
flation in the Czech Republic may as well be explained by the
differences between the two countries’ inflation history. Char-
acteristically, the Czech Republic was the only country in the
region which managed to avoid hyperinflation after World War
I. The experience of the past 20 years influenced expectations
perhaps more strongly, when the highest and average rates of
inflation in the Czech Republic both have remained below
those observed in the case of Poland.
5. 4 The impact of world recession on
certain European economies
The Bank has always emphasised in its previous Reports thatthe real economic developments which have a major in-
fluence over the path of disinflation are very sensitive to ex-
ternal activity.
Thus, the factors to blame for the slowdown in Hungarian
manufacturing output, private investment and export activity
include the global recession which started in 2000 Q4. Admit-
tedly, the strong appreciation of the forint first since May 2001
also hindered growth in these real economic variables, but it
Chart 5.6 Czech tradables and market services
price inflation
(For tradables and market services, trend of annualised month-on-
month growth rates)
Chart 5.7 Czech and Polish unit labour costs in
manufacturing
Annual growth rates*
Chart 5.8 Inflation history of the Czech Republic
and Poland*
Market services
Tradables Euro/koruna exchange rate (right scale)
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would be mistaken to think that the slowdown was due pre-
dominantly to the appreciation. In order to give a better illus-
tration of the effect of cyclical conditions, let us take a look at
some recent developments in key industrial (manufacturing)
variables of a few small EU economies, where, thanks to EMU
membership, assessment is not affected by nominal exchange
rate changes.
Of the EU economies Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
have been selected for analysis, as they are viewed as small,
open peripheral economies within the EU, just as Hungary will
be following accession in 2004. As all four countries have
adopted the single European currency, developments in their
major macroeconomic variables since the onset of global re-
cession at end-2000 have not been affected by exchange rate
changes.
Within six months of the downturn in the business cycle,
industrial output growth decelerated in each economy except
Portugal (where manufacturing indices had been worsening
even previously when European activity was still robust). The
downturn was substantial for Finland and Spain, and some-
what less marked for Ireland. Manufacturing employment
showed a similar decline, but since the slowdown of the Span-
ish economy appeared only from the second half of 2001, it is
thus only reflected in the data for 2002 Q2. While investment
growth fell off within the private sector of each country in a
year-on-year comparison, export growth suffered the greatest
setback, down from a typical rate of 10% to nearly flat (even
negative for Portugal) levels. At the same time, the timing of
the impact varied across countries.
Industry (manufacturing) seems to have shown, in general, a
strong response to the global economic recession, and the
countries examined above each had at least one variable which
suffered a substantial decline in its rate of growth.
The variables for Hungary also reflect similar developments
as in the other countries. Perhaps the fall in manufacturing
growth exceeds the average for this country group, while the
decline in employment and private sector investment is not
conspicuous. Undoubtedly, one of the factors behind the pro-
nounced decline in Hungarian export growth has been the
appreciation of the forint. Clearly, however, the export growth
of the Finnish, Irish and Portuguese economies, which have
not experienced any currency appreciation, have also slowed
down to the same extent.
Table 5.4 Key economic variables in selected EU economies and Hungary*
Output Employment Private investment Exports
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
Finland 9.9 –2.2 5.0 2.2 –0.5 –0.7 5.1 4.1 –0.9 26.0 –0.8 0.9
Ireland 20.8 12.1 11.7 5.4 0.5 –4.0 4.5 –0.1 3.0 17.0 11.7 –0.1
Portugal –1.7 5.5 0.2 –2.6 –3.7 –4.3 8.7 –3.6 0.0 2.4 9.2 –11.4
Spain 5.7 –1.2 –0.9 4.1 4.3 1.5 7.8 3.8 0.7 11.6 3.2 0.1
Hungary 23.7 6.2 2.8 2.5 –0.1 –2.2 2.5 2.1 –2.9 23.3 11.6 6.3
* Growth rates in the second quarter of the reviewed year relative to the second quarter of the previous year.
Output: industrial production, except for Hungary, where it is manufacturing production.
Employment: manufacturing employment, except for Finland, where the employment figures refer to the entire industrial sector.
Private investment: excluding household investment in respect of Hungary.
Exports: volume of goods exports.
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, NIGEM database, Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
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The fact that the manufacturing sectors of the small, open
EU member states showed largely the same response as in
Hungary indicates that the decline in growth rates of the vari-
ous variables stemmed predominantly from other sources than
the appreciation of the forint.
5. 5 Inflation expectations for end-
2002, following band widening in
2001
The MNB launched its inflation targeting system in June 2001,
setting a target jointly with the Government of 4.5% ±1% for
December 2002. The new regime had a mixed reception from
both market participants and economists. In fact, very few be-
lieved that the system would actually work.
In the following an analysis is presented of how analysts
and the Bank have changed their CPI forecasts for December
2002 using the Reuters-poll and the MNB Inflation Reports
since August 2001.36 The study also looks beyond the Reuters
consensus to see whether there is a difference between two
groups, ‘private sector forecasters’ (PSF) and ‘research institu-
tions’ (RI).37
Note that, in harmony with the central bank’s scope of re-
sponsibility, the MNB’s forecasting system is based on some
rigid assumptions on fiscal and monetary policy and also some
key exogenous variables (exchange rates and oil price), and
consequently it cannot be viewed as the best possible forecast
based on the most comprehensive set of information.
In the summer of 2001, the low credibility of the new infla-
tion targeting regime was clearly reflected in the fact that the
inflation forecasts of the analysts surveyed by Reuters were con-
siderably higher than the announced inflation target for end
2002. Among the group of analyst surveyed by the Reuters af-
ter the publication of the first set of MNB forecasts in August
2001 the forecast of the RIs was significantly (almost 1 percent-
age point) higher than that of the PSFs.
Both the analysts and the Bank revised their expectations
down in the course of 2001, so the market and the MNB’s fore-
casts have come closer from early 2002. While the MNB usu-
ally increased its CPI projections, market participants lowered
theirs in most cases. The only exception was May 2002, when
both market analysts and research institutes increased their
inflation forecasts.
The credibility of the end-2002 target was on a steady in-
crease among analysts. PSFs started to believe sooner than RIs
that the December 2002 inflation target could be met. Moreo-
ver, the graph above suggests that RIs could be characterised
by a somewhat asymmetric and also more volatile forecast
updating pattern. RIs started with the highest forecast in Au-
Chart 5.9 Inflation projections for December 2002
* MNB: Quarterly reports on inflation, the other data are based on
the Reuters surveys. Dates are the publication dates of the MNB
Reports.
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36 For more on this subject, see Krekó Judit and Vonnák Balázs: Macroanalysts’ infla-
tion expectations in Hungary, January 2003, MNB Background Studies; 1/2003.
37 The ‘research institutions’ (RI) group consists of GKI, KOPINT, Pénzügykutató
and Ecostat, all of which are Hungarian research institutions more or less frequently
participating in the Reuters poll. ‘Private sector forecasters’ (PSF) are usually finan-
cial sector professional macroanalysts.
53FEBRUARY 2003 • QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
5 Special topics
gust 2001, then reached the same low point by early 2002 as
PSFs. By mid-2002 however RIs again had the highest CPI fore-
cast before gradually converging to those of the PFSs and the
MNB by the end of 2002.
Finally, the actual year-on-year CPI stood at 4.8% in Decem-
ber 2002, which means that the MNB successfully met the 4.5%
±1% inflation target set in 2001 with the Government.
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